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INTRODUCTION
[T]he injury caused by the discrimination is made more severe
because the government permits it to occur within the courthouse
itself. Few places are a more real expression of the constitutional
authority of the government than a courtroom, where the law itself
1
unfolds.
2

Homosexual people in the United States are becoming an
3
increasingly well-organized and visible minority. Although the actual
number of homosexual people in the United States is largely
1. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (holding that
“the race-based exclusion of potential jurors in a civil case violates the excluded
person’s equal protection rights”).
2. In this Comment, the term “homosexual” includes lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and transsexual people. See, e.g., BYRNE FONE, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY
50 (2000) (discussing the origins of the term “homosexual”). Historically, the term
“homosexual” has been used to classify diverse groups of people primarily based on
their sexual attraction to members of the same gender. See id. at 4-5 (tracing the
development of the term “homosexual” and its use in everyday parlance). Contrary
to this commonly accepted conduct-based classification, the term “homosexual” will
be used in this Comment to connote a self-identified or perceived status or lifestyle,
irrespective of sexual activity or conduct.
3. The number of nationwide politically activist organizations dedicated to
establishing social and legal equality for homosexuals has proliferated over the last
thirty years. Examples include: Gays and Lesbians Against Defamation (“GLADD”);
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (“NGLTF”); Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund; Human Rights Campaign (“HRC”); Servicemembers Legal
Education Defense Network (“SLDN”); Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered
Veterans of America; and the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association (“NLGLA”).
Also telling is the number of homosexual characters regularly appearing on prime
time television shows. According to GLADD, there were twenty-seven gay lead,
supporting, and recurring characters in prime-time series programming in the 20002001 season. See Bonnie J. Dow, Ellen, Television, and the Politics of Gay and Lesbian
Visibility, 18 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMM. 2 (2001) (discussing the importance of
homosexual characters on television as both a cause of societal acceptance as well as
an effect).
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unknown, information recently released by the U.S. Census Bureau
demonstrates a dramatic increase in the number of same-sex partner
5
households. With an increase in visibility, social acceptance of
homosexuals and their lifestyles—as reported in major polling data—
6
also appears to have increased substantially over the last thirty years.
Despite these strides, recent actions by state legislators and voters
across the country belie the picture of a more tolerant attitude

4. See Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of
Lesbian and Gay Identity in the Courts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 566 (2001)
(explaining that many homosexual people who face discrimination, ridicule, loss of
contracts, and termination of employment chose to live “in the closet” by concealing
or denying their sexual orientation to others).
5. See Karen S. Peterson, Changes Boost Gay Household Tally, USA TODAY, July 10,
2001, at A1 (reporting that changes by the U.S. Census Bureau in the compilation of
population statistics yielded substantial data on the number of homosexual people).
In 1990, the Census Bureau reclassified householders who claimed to have same-sex
spouses into different categories. See id. (noting that the Census Bureau either
changed the sex of one of the same-sex spouses or listed one spouse as either a
sibling or roommate). In 2000, the Census Bureau changed its procedure and
allowed householders to claim an “unmarried partner” then declare their sex. See id.
(noting that under the revised procedure, same-sex partnerships could be tallied).
As a result of the substantial undercounting by the 1990 census and the subsequent
changes to the 2000 census, the reported number of same-sex partner households
has increased astronomically in many states: Delaware 781%; Alabama 658%;
Vermont 422%; Colorado 385%; Illinois 268%; New York 238%. See Most U.S.
Counties Include Gay Families, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2001, at D6 (revealing that
according to census figures “gay and lesbian families” live in 99.3% of all American
counties; and that the total number of “gay and lesbian families” counted in the 2000
census was 594,391). But see Genaro C. Armas, Census’ Same-Sex Data Scrutinized, AP
ONLINE, July 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24710679 (describing the position taken
by the Census Bureau that “estimates of same-sex unmarried partners are not
comparable between the 1990 and 2000 census”); Technical Note on Same-Sex
Unmarried Partner Data From the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, U.S. Census Bureau,
Population Division, Fertility & Family Statistics Branch, at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/cen200/samesex.html (last modified June 29, 2001).
6. See Alan S. Yang, The 2000 National Election Survey and Gay and Lesbian Rights:
Support for Equality Grows, at http://www.ngltf.org/library/index.cfm (last modified
June 29, 2001) (finding that 41.4% of Americans support gay adoption, while 50.5%
oppose it; 71.2% support the right of homosexuals to serve in the military, while
22.9% oppose it; and 63.9% support sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws,
while 30.9% oppose it); see also SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 168
(1999) (reporting that the percentage of Americans who think homosexual relations
between consenting adults should be legal increased from forty-three percent in
1977 to fifty percent in 1999; and college freshmen reporting that homosexual
relations should be legally prohibited decreased from forty-seven percent in 1976 to
thirty-three percent in 1998); Derek Rose, Teens Back Marriage By Gays; A Poll Finds,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2001 (stating that in a national poll of one thousand high
school seniors, seventy-nine percent agreed with laws banning job discrimination
based on sexual orientation; eighty-eight percent favored laws against hate crimes
directed against homosexual people; and sixty-six percent favored legalizing samesex marriages); Alan S. Yang, From Wrongs to Rights: Public Opinion on Gay and Lesbian
Americans Moves Toward Equality, Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, available at http://www.ngltf.org/library/index.cfm (observing trends in
national polling data that suggest greater societal acceptance of homosexual
people).
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toward homosexuals drawn by these polls. In the November 2000
election, voters in several states elected to prohibit same-sex
8
marriages and to repeal existing non-discrimination statutes that
9
included homosexuals. A wave of public opposition to state and
local anti-discrimination statutes has also developed in response to
the efforts of some municipalities and charitable organizations to use
these statutes to prevent the Boy Scouts of America, which exclude
homosexual scoutmasters, from using public resources or receiving
10
financial contributions. In January 2001, President George W. Bush
11
also introduced a “Faith Based Initiative” that proposes allowing
7. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
8. See Joyce Howard Price, Gay-Rights Measures Meet With Defeat in Three States;
Maine Ballot Initiative Appears Headed for a Recount, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A10
(observing that seventy percent of voters in Nebraska and Nevada supported ballot
initiatives to amend the states’ constitutions to ban same-sex marriages, and further
noting that the Nevada amendment will need approval by the voters in that state in
another general election before taking effect).
9. See Doug Ireland, Same-Sexers Under Siege: The Right-Wing Crusade to Roll Back
Gay Civil Rights is Gathering Momentum, NATION, July 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL
2132703 (detailing the states and cities that have removed sexual orientation from
their anti-discrimination statutes and the cities where referendums to remove such
statutes are likely to be placed on upcoming ballots); see also Press Release, National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, GLBT Communities Expected to Face 12 Hostile Ballot
Measures in Next 16 Months (July 25, 2001) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ngltf.org/news/release (describing the municipalities, counties, and
states where measures will be placed on upcoming ballots to repeal existing
protections for homosexuals). But see John Flesher, Five Cities Vote on Gay-Rights
Issues, AP ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2001 available at 2001 WL 29791468 (reporting on how
voters in five cities voted on ballot issues pertaining to gay-rights). In Traverse City
and Kalamazoo, Michigan, voters rejected amendments that would have prevented
the cities from enacting policies to protect homosexuals from discrimination. Id.
Voters in Miami, Florida, decided that the city should provide employee benefits to
domestic partners; and in Huntington Woods, Michigan, voters upheld a municipal
ordinance that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id.
Finally, voters in Houston, Texas, disapproved a measure that would require the city
to offer health care coverage to domestic partners. Id.
10. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the State of
New Jersey’s use of an anti-discrimination statute to force the Boy Scouts to admit a
homosexual assistant scoutmaster violated the organization’s First Amendment right
to “expressive association”); David France, Scouts Divided, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2001, at 45
(chronicling developments within the Boy Scouts of America as an organization since
Dale, and reporting that companies such as Fleet Bank, Medtronic, Inc., and Wells
Fargo have scaled back their funding to the Boy Scouts, and that companies such as
CVS and Levi Strauss have ceased their donations to the Boy Scouts); Harrison
Sheppard, Boy Scouts Ban, Limits Assailed, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 28, 2001, available at
2001 WL 6050160 (reporting that the response of many states, counties,
municipalities and charitable organizations to limit financial contributions to the Boy
Scouts and to limit the Boy Scouts’ access to public facilities, has met great resistance
from the public).
11. See Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8495 (Jan. 31, 2001) (establishing
an Executive Branch agency to “to coordinate department efforts to eliminate
regulatory, contracting, and other programmatic obstacles to the participation of
faith-based and other community organizations in the provision of social services.”);
Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 31, 2001) (creating the “White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives”).
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religious organizations to compete for federal grants without losing
12
their exemption from federal anti-discrimination statutes. Perhaps
the most glaring sign of the growing hostility toward homosexuals is
the establishment of an inter-faith religious organization that
advocates amending the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex
13
marriages.
14
In addition to the myriad of hostile laws already in place, and
12. See Remarks Announcing the Faith-Based Initiative, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 231 (Feb. 5, 2001) (stating that “faith-based charities should be able to compete
for funding on an equal basis and in a manner that does not cause them to sacrifice
their mission.”); President’s Remarks to the Fishing School, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 241 (Feb. 5, 2001) (speaking about how faith-based organizations have rallied
together towards the implemention of the Faith-Based Initiative); H.R. 7, 107th
Cong. (2001) (the “Community Solutions Act of 2001” or the “Faith-Based Initiative”
bill that proposed legislatively the incentives for charitable contributions
subsequently provided in President Bush’s program). On July 19, 2001, the United
States House of Representatives voted 233-198-3 in favor of passing H.R. 7. See CONG.
REC. H4281 (daily ed. July 19, 2001). See also Jeanne Cummings & Jim VandeHei,
Faith-Based Initiative Takes Worldly, Rocky Path, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2001, at A16
(detailing the chronology of events surrounding the faith-based initiative from it’s
introduction to the U.S. House of Representatives, to it’s “death” in the U.S. Senate;
and reporting that the White House conducted private talks with the Salvation Army,
which offered support for the legislation in return for White House consideration of
new regulations that would shield the Salvation Army from state and local antidiscrimination laws); Bill Myers, States, Counties, Cities and Towns with AntiDiscrimination Laws Based on Sexual Orientation, at http://www.actwin.com/
eatonohio/gay/gayri.htm (last modified Nov. 8, 2001) (charting the states, counties,
and municipalities and the areas that their anti-discrimination statutes cover and
revealing that 25 states, 53 counties, and 207 municipalities have anti-discrimination
laws that include sexual orientation and apply variously to public employment,
public accommodations, private employment, education, housing, credit, and union
practices).
13. See Carolyn Lochhead, Religious Leaders Back Anti-Gay Initiative/Constitutional
Amendment to Bar Same-sex Marriage, S.F. CHRON., July 13, 2001, at A6 (describing a
proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that states: “Marriage in the United
States shall consist only of the union of a man and woman. Neither this Constitution
or the constitution of any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require
that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried
couples or groups.”).
14. The various state sodomy laws that essentially criminalize the non-celibate
homosexual lifestyle are just one example of laws that are hostile to homosexual
people. Eleven states have sodomy laws that prohibit consensual sex between
persons irrespective of gender. Interestingly, many of the statutes label these acts of
consensual sex as a “crime against nature,” and in many instances they are the same
statutes that prohibit the carnal knowledge of animals. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60, 65
(2001) (“Deviate sexual intercourse is any act of sexual gratification between persons
not married to each other involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another.”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1112 (2001) (“It is a felony to take the
sexual organ of another person into one’s mouth or anus or to place one’s sexual
organ in the mouth or anus of another or to have carnal copulation in an opening of
the body other than the sexual parts with another person.”); FLA. STAT. ch. 800.02
(2001) (“A person who commits any unnatural and lascivious act with another
person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2
(2001) (“Sodomy consists of performing or submitting to any sexual act involving the
sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”); IDAHO CODE § 186605 (Michie 2001) (“The infamous crime against nature is a felony.”); LA. REV.
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STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 2001) (“The unnatural carnal copulation by a human being
with another of the same or opposite sex is a crime against nature and is a felony.”);
MD. CODE ANN. [Crimes and Punishments] § 554 (2001) (“Every person who is
convicted of taking into his or her mouth the sexual organ of any other person or
animal, or who shall be convicted of placing his or her sexual organ in the mouth of
any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of committing any other
unnatural or perverted sexual practice with any other person or animal, shall be
fine[d] . . . or be imprisoned in jail . . . .”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (West
2001) (“Whoever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature is
guilty of a felony.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158 (2001) (“It is a felony to commit
the abominable and detestable crime against nature.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59
(2001) (“Every person convicted of the detestable and abominable crime against
nature is guilty of a felony.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (2001) (“Deviate sexual
relations between two persons is a felony.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00 (2001)
(“Deviate sexual intercourse means sexual conduct between persons not married to
each other consisting of conduct between the penis and the anus, the mouth and the
penis, or the mouth and the vulva.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2001) (“It is a felony
to commit the crime against nature.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (2001) (“Any person
who is guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with
mankind or with a beast, shall of guilty of a felony . . . .”); 18 PA. CODE STAT. § 2709
(2001) (“An offense relating to deviate sexual intercourse shall constitute a
misdemeanor of the first degree”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (2001) (“Anyone who
commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature with another person
commits a felony carrying a seven-year minimum sentence.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1615-120 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (“Buggery is a felony.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403
(2001) (“It is a misdemeanor called sodomy to engage in any sexual act involving the
genitals of one person and mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the
gender of either participant.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 2001) (“It is a
felony designated as a crime against nature to carnally know any male or female
person by or with the anus or mouth or to submit to such carnal knowledge.”).
Six states have sodomy laws that specifically prohibit consensual sex between
people of the same-sex. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (2001) (“Sodomy is any act of
sexual gratification involving the penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth
of a male by the penis of another male; or the penetration, however slight of the
anus or vagina of a female by any body member of another female.”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3505 (2001) (“Sodomy between persons of the same sex is a
misdemeanor.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (“It is a
misdemeanor to engage in deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the
same sex.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (2000) (“A person commits the crime of
sexual misconduct in the first degree if he has deviate sexual intercourse with
another person of the same sex . . . sexual misconduct in the first degree is a class A
misdemeanor.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (2001) (“It is a misdemeanor to
engage in consensual sexual penetration with a person of the same gender.”); TEX.
PENAL. CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2001).
The Federal Government and thirty-four states have laws that prohibit the
recognition of marriage between persons of the same gender. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 7
(West 2000) (codifying the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, and defining marriage
as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife”); ALA.
CODE § 30-1-19 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-101,112 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-107, 190, 208 (Michie 2001); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-110 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit 13, §§ 101-104 (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1;
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2000); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-202, 209 (Michie 2001); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/213.1, 216 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (Michie 2001); IOWA
CODE § 595.2 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-201 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 402.020, 402.045 (Banks-Baldwin 2001); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 701 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 551.1, 551.271,
551.272 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2001); MO.
REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT.
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pending legislation that threatens to eviscerate the gains toward
equal treatment made over the last thirty years, homosexuals face
16
rampant discrimination inside the nation’s courtrooms.
Despite
canons of ethics and local court rules that prohibit prejudicial
17
conduct on the basis of sexual orientation, lawyers, judges, and
§ 42-117 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2001);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1704 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law.Coop. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-38 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113
(2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2, 4 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2001);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 48-1-18a (2001). But see VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 23 (2001) (recognizing “civil unions” between persons of the
same sex and conferring some civil rights to the members of those “unions”); CAL.
FAM. CODE §§ 297-298 (West 2001) (establishing “domestic partnerships” and
conferring various civil rights to domestic partners that were traditionally enjoyed by
married couples, such as hospital visitation and the administration of estates). See
generally Frank Murray, Judge Asked to Skip Trial, License Gay ‘Marriages’ in Massachusetts,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at A4 (reporting that two women sued the Massachusetts
Public Health Commissioner in Suffolk Superior Court to gain the state’s
recognition of their “marriage,” and noting that the Massachusetts Attorney General
is considering two voter-initiatives submitted for the 2004 ballot seeking to re-write a
definition of marriage into the state’s Constitution). But see generally Law Allows Gay
Unions in Germany; Couples Exchange Vows in Berlin as Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ Legislation
Takes Effect, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 2, 2001, at A7 (observing that a German law
allows gay couples to register their unions at government offices, requiring a court
decision for divorce; and that same-sex couples also receive inheritance and health
insurance rights); Gay Couples Marry Under New Dutch Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at
A9 (revealing that a Dutch law not only recognizes marriages between persons of the
same gender, but it also “eliminates references to gender in the laws governing
matrimony and adoption,” and “amend[s] the dictionary to eliminate references to
‘man and woman’ in the definition of marriage”).
15. Five states have pending legislation that would prohibit the state’s
recognition of same-sex marriages. See H.B. 3375, 182d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2001) (in Joint Committee on Judiciary June 19, 2001; extension order filed and
extended until Dec. 15, 2001); S.B. 57, 224th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (sent to
Senate Judiciary Committee on Jan. 11, 2000); S.B. 2195, 224th Ann. Legis. Sess.
(N.Y. 2001) (sent to Senate Committee on Judiciary on Feb. 5, 2001); H.B. 234,
124th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess (Ohio 2001) (passed by the House of Representatives
on Oct. 31, 2001); S.B. 488, 77th Leg. (Tex. 2001) (reported favorably from House
Committee on State Affairs on May 17, 2001); H.B. 350, 66th Biennial Sess. (Vt.
2001) (sent to House Committee on Judiciary on February 27, 2001). New York is
the only state with pending legislation to allow same-sex marriages. See S.B. 1205,
224th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (sent to Senate Committee on Judiciary on Jan.
17, 2001).
16. See infra Parts I.A, II.B.
17. The Model Code of Judical Conduct States that:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias
or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race,
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others
subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.
Model Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 3(B)(5) (1999) (emphasis added). Twentyeight state court systems have incorporated Canon 3 into their own rules of judicial
conduct. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-Bias
Canons as a Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363, 450 n.9 (2000)
[hereinafter Brown] (collecting the citations of each state’s version of Canon
(3)(B)(5) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct). See generally William C. Duncan,
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court personnel often express homophobic attitudes in open court.
Homosexual litigants, jurors, attorneys, and court personnel not only
face a system of hostile laws, but also an institution charged with
administering those laws that often permits equally homophobic
19
behavior.
Worse still, as this Comment argues, the hostility from within the
legal community can often manifest itself in the most egregious form
20
possible: death sentences for criminal defendants. This hostility
“A Lawyer Class”: Views on Marriage and “Sexual Orientation” in the Legal Profession, 15
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 137 (2001) (discussing the prevalence of state and local legal ethics
codes and court rules that includes language prohibiting biased conduct based on
sexual orientation); David S. Buckel, Fighting for Sexual Orientation Fairness in the
Courts, Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund (1997) (evaluating the role of
judicial canons to combat sexual orientation discrimination in the courtroom, and
collecting the citations of each state’s judicial canons that prohibit bias on the basis
of sexual orientation by members of the bar). There are eight federal courts that
have rules specifically prohibiting biased conduct based on sexual orientation. See,
e.g., D. ARIZ. R. 1.20; BANKR. D. ARIZ. R. 1000-1; D. IDAHO ORDER 112; BANKR. D.
IDAHO ORDER 112; D. N.J. APP. R; W.D. WASH. GEN. R. 9; N.D.W.VA. LOCAL R. GEN.
PRAC. 3.02; S.D.W.VA. LOCAL R. GEN. PRAC. 3.02. In addition, ten state court systems
have rules or codes of professional conduct that specifically prohibit bias on the basis
of sexual orientation. See, e.g., CAL. ST. R. APP. DIV. 1 JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 1; D.C. R.P.C.
9.1; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63; ILL. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4; MASS. R. 3:07, 3.4; N.J. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT 8.4; N.J. R. JUDICIAL EMPLOYEE CONDUCT CANON 1; N.M. R. PROF’L CONDUCT
16-300; N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4; TEX. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.08; VT. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT 8.4; WASH. ORDER 00-66. Finally, ten county court systems have similar
rules. See, e.g., CAL. R. ALAMEDA SUPER. CT. 2.0; CAL. R. CONTRA COSTA PROF’L
COURTESY STDS. 3, CAL. CONTRA COSTA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION APP. D; CAL.
R. SACRAMENTO BAR ASSOC. STDS. PROF’L CONDUCT § 3; CAL. R. SACRAMENTO SUPER.
CT. 9.24; CAL. R. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. DIV. 1, R. 2.1; CAL. R. S. F. SUPER. CT. 2.7; CAL.
R. SANTA BARBARA SUPER. CT. APP. 5; CAL. R. SANTA CRUZ SUPER. CT. EXHIBIT D-1; CAL.
R. SANTA CRUZ SUPER CT. EXHIBIT D-2; CAL. R. SISKIYOU SUPER. CT. APP. 2; CAL. R.
SONOMA SUPER. CT. 21.2; WASH. R. ISLAND AND SAN JUAN SUPER. CT. CIV. APP. F.
18. Professor Byrne Fone attempts to define the term “homophobia” in his book
bearing the same title. See FONE, supra note 2, at 424 n.5 (describing the word’s
construction as a slang abbreviation for the word “homosexual” joined with “phobia,”
which is Latin for fear). The term was most likely coined in a 1971 article appearing
in Psychological Reports. See id. at 5 (commenting that the term only recently has
been introduced into the American vocabulary). The term “homophobia” itself
inadequately conveys the feelings of antipathy and dislike toward homosexual people
and homosexuality generally. See id. (defining homophobia as “the fear and dislike
of homosexuality and of those who practice it”). This Comment will use the term as
it is popularly construed.
19. See infra Part I (discussing the courtroom as a hostile environment for
homosexual people); see also Report: Findings From the Survey on Barriers and
Opportunities Related to Sexual Orientation, Bar of the City of New York (1995)
(providing anecdotal evidence that illustrates the gravity of hostility in the
courtroom). “After a hearing, a defense attorney turned to the assistant DA and
called him a ‘flaming faggot.’” Id. at 5. “A gay male attorney was taking a long time
to interview a male defendant during arraignments. The judge, ADA [Assistant
District Attorney] and court personnel joked that the attorney was probably trying to
date the defendant.” Id. “When I indicated I was familiar with the hotel [involved in
a case] the judge said, ‘Oh, I didn’t know it was a gay hotel!’ This was in front of a
courtroom full of people.” Id. at 6.
20. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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culminates in the real possibility that homosexual defendants found
guilty of heinous crimes may receive the death penalty, as opposed to
21
life sentences, because of their status as homosexuals. Indeed, in
22
many cases, a defendant’s sexual orientation plays a key role in the
23
prosecutor’s trial and sentencing strategy.
Prosecuting attorneys
actually use the defendant’s sexual orientation in various prejudicial
ways in order to solidify the chances of securing a death sentence
24
from the jury. For example, prosecutors make calculated decisions
about when and how to introduce evidence of a criminal defendant’s
25
previously undisclosed sexual orientation. Prosecutors also present
arguments to the jury that blatantly stereotype and degrade
26
homosexuals. Unfortunately, these are all too common occurrences
in death penalty cases in the United States.
Part I of this Comment explores the institutionalization of
homophobia in the legal system generally. Part II provides a
narrative of four cases that illustrate the homophobic bias in death
sentences for criminal defendants whom might otherwise have
received life sentences. Part III argues that the current standard of
review for prosecutorial misconduct that federal courts employ when
21. See Richard Goldstein, Queer on Death Row: In Murder Cases, Being Gay Can Seal
a Defendant’s Fate, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 20, 2001; Peter Freiberg, Gays Sentenced to Die:
Death Row Cases’ Lawyers Charge Homophobia, WASH. BLADE, Feb. 2, 2001;
Memorandum from Eric Ferrero, Public Education Director, American Civil
Liberties Union, National Office, Lesbian & Gay Rights and AIDS Projects, America’s
Unjust Capital Punishment System and LGBT People (July 23, 2001) (on file with
author). Part II discusses how prosecutors often use a criminal defendant’s sexual
orientation to garner support from the jury for a sentence of death as opposed to a
sentence of life in prison. See David Rovella, Criminal Cases; Poll Elicits Fear of Rogue
Jury, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A25 (reporting that according to a national survey of
potential jurors: (1) seventy-six percent agreed with the statement “[w]hatever the
judge says the law is, jurors should do what they believe is the right thing;” and (2)
seventeen percent admitted that they could not be fair if a party to a case was
homosexual).
22. It is difficult to discern the true extent to which prosecutors either misuse
evidence or make improper arguments about a defendant’s sexual orientation. Part
II of this Comment discusses four cases where the prosecutor’s use of the defendant’s
sexual orientation became an issue on direct appeal and subsequently collateral
attack under habeas review in federal court. Discovering these, and similar, cases
depends in large part on many variables, including: (1) that the convicted individual
and/or their attorney recognizes the prosecutor’s inappropriate actions, (2) raise
specific objections to these actions and appeal their conviction, (3) that the courts of
appeal actually reach the specific issue as it is raised on appeal, and (4) that the
appellate court’s opinion is published. As Part I of this Comment demonstrates, bias
against homosexuals pervades the legal system as a whole. It seems fair to speculate,
then, that this type of prosecutorial misconduct is much more pervasive than the
four cases addressed in this Comment, on their face, might suggest.
23. See Goldstein, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. See Goldstein, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. See Goldstein, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. See Goldstein, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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reviewing state death penalty cases inadequately protects homosexual
criminal defendants. Part IV argues that a criminal defendant’s
sexual orientation should never be a consideration in determining
whether to impose the state’s ultimate form of punishment—the
death penalty.
I.

THE LEGAL COMMUNITY: A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT FOR
HOMOSEXUALS

Within the courtroom, the government invokes its laws to
determine the rights of those who stand before it. In full view of
the public, litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony,
juries render verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to
27
ensure that justice is done.

Despite this idealistic description, the courtroom is all too often a
forum for biased and discriminatory behavior of judges and
attorneys. For example, in a 1991 case involving a plaintiff
challenging his dismissal from the U.S. Naval Academy for being gay,
U.S. District Court Judge Oliver Gasch repeatedly referred to the
28
plaintiff and gay men in general as “homos.” In a 1997 sentencing,
a District Court of Appeals judge in Florida, after learning that the
female probationer was living with her lesbian partner, said, “I’ll tell
you ma’am. This is a sick situation . . . I’ve seen a lot of sick situations
since I’ve been in this court. I’ve been in this profession for 27 years
29
and this ranks at the top.”
After announcing the sentence for
violating the terms of her probation, the judge observed that “[i]f this
30
is the family of 1997, heaven help us.”
In the 1998 sentencing of a homosexual defendant who had just
been convicted of sexually assaulting a thirteen year-old boy that he
27. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (holding that
a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors
on account of race).
28. See Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), rev’d sub nom. Steffan v.
Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev’d on reh’g en banc, Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Judge Gasch’s response to a discovery request from
Steffan’s attorney: “The most I would allow is what relates to this plaintiff, not every
‘homo’ that may be walking the face of the earth at this time.”); see also Tracy
Thompson, Judge Refuses to Leave Case for Saying ‘Homo,’ WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1991, at
B3 (reporting that based on Judge Gasch’s comments, Steffan’s attorneys filed a
motion to disqualify Judge Gasch, which he denied and stated: “In using the term
[“Homo”], the court equated the term with homosexual.
No offense was
intended.”).
29. See Rucks v. Florida, 692 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting
the trial judge’s remarks at the sentencing hearing).
30. See id. (granting an informal writ of prohibition “on the assumption that the
trial judge will remove himself”). Significantly, in its decision, the District Court of
Appeals failed to publicly censure the trial court judge. See id.
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met on the Internet, a Nebraska District Court judge for Sarpy
31
County read a Bible passage disparaging homosexuality.
After
reading the Bible passage, the judge stated that he had considered
32
the “nature . . . of the defendant” and found that imprisonment was
33
necessary for the safety of the public. While the Supreme Court of
Nebraska vacated the sentence and ordered a new sentencing
hearing by a different judge, it neglected to include any public
34
censure or reprimand of the trial judge in its decision.
Unfortunately, these are only a sample of cases where trial courts
have allowed a criminal defendant’s status as a homosexual to be
35
used against them in determining a sentence. Indeed, the court
31. See State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Neb. 1998). The opinion quotes
the passage:
For this reason God gave them up to dishonorable passions. Their women
exchanged natural relations for unnatural, and the men likewise gave up
natural relations with women and were consumed with passion for one
another, men committing shameless acts with men and receiving in their
own persons the due penalty for their error.
Id.
32. See id. at 509 (noting that Pattno had no history of prior child molestation or
sexual assault and insinuating that the defendant’s sexual orientation was his
“nature”).
33. See id. at 505 (conceding that the Pre Sentence Investigation (“PSI”) report
recommended that if the trial judge selected probation, the defendant should,
among other things, continue counseling and complete an offender’s work
program). Also note that in Florida the Class IV felony with which the defendant was
charged was punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or
both. See id. at 509 (reflecting Florida law at the time the defendant was charged).
Significantly, there was no minimum sentence of incarceration or fine required. See
id. (noting that only a maximum sentence was provided for by statute). Pattno was
sentenced to not less than twenty months and no more than five years in prison. See
id. at 506 (noting that the judge made the maximum sentence an available option).
34. See Pattno, 579 N.W.2d at 509 (reasoning that the trial judge’s comments
during sentencing “could cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality of
the judge”). The Nebraska Supreme Court framed its decision in terms of the
general “reasonable person” and “impartiality” standards. See id. (excluding
discussion of the particular type of bias exhibited by the judge).
35. See People v. Cunningham, 25 P.3d 519, 573-79 (Cal. 2001) (denying habeas
corpus relief to a death penalty defendant where in the penalty phase of the trial the
prosecutor presented evidence of an unadjudicated attempted sodomy charge from
a prior imprisonment); Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 399 (Ind. 1999) (ruling that
the prosecutor’s introduction of photographs and videotapes of appellant and a
male friend, arguably to insinuate that they were homosexual, were properly
admitted even though a pre-trial agreement between the parties barred such
evidence); Ex parte Jackson, 674 So. 2d 1365, 1368 (Ala. 1995) (denying a death
penalty defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor called
two homosexual witnesses and introduced forensic evidence that there was semen on
defendant’s underwear when he was arrested; and holding that “the court did not err
in admitting the evidence suggesting that [defendant] might be homosexual or
bisexual and in allowing the jury to draw reasonable inferences therefrom”); State v.
Wilson, No. 22041-5-II, 1999 WL 1048646, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1999)
(concluding that the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to ask a
defense witness if he and the defendant were engaged in a homosexual relationship
during cross-examination); State v. Wells, No. 94-CA-2255, 1995 WL 502249, at *5
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system itself can be a hostile environment for homosexual criminal
36
defendants. From the limited research that is available, it appears
that these occurrences of hostility directed toward homosexual
37
criminal defendants are neither isolated nor infrequent.
Unlike
race and gender bias, however, prejudice against homosexuals within
the legal system receives very little attention from the legal
38
community. In fact, while almost all of the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal have established some administrative body to address the
39
occurrence of race and gender bias within their courts, none have
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995) (finding that while the prosecutor’s cross-examination
of appellant regarding homosexual relationships while in prison constituted
prejudicial misconduct, it did not rise to the level of plain error); Noske v. State, No.
CO-91-2486, 1992 WL 365990, at 3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1992) (holding that
while evidence of homosexual activity in a criminal case is considered inherently
prejudicial unless it has some particular relevance to an element of a crime, the
circumstances of the case did not warrant a new trial). See infra Part III (discussing
the standard of review for prosecutorial remarks such as these, and arguing that the
standard of review leaves homosexual defendants largely unprotected).
36. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. See also infra Part II (addressing
four death penalty cases where the prosecutors used evidence of the criminal
defendants’ sexual orientation against them in various ways in order to solidify the
chances of a death sentence).
37. See infra Part I.A & B (discussing two statewide studies that address the
prevalence and extent of sexual orientation bias within the legal community).
38. See Report #10A, American Bar Association, Aug. 5, 1996 (on file with
author) (providing the 1996 Resolution of the American Bar Association House of
Delegates that calls on state, territorial, and local bar associations to “study bias in
their community against gays and lesbians within the legal profession and the justice
system and make appropriate recommendations to eliminate such bias”). Only
fourteen studies have actually been conducted to date. For a discussion of the first
eleven sexual orientation bias studies, see Durkin, infra note 41 and accompanying
text. The remaining three studies were conducted on a statewide basis: Arizona,
California, and New Jersey. See infra notes 41-42. Significantly, the American Bar
Association has not attempted to specifically track and record the state and local bar
organizations’ compliance with the 1996 resolution. See American Bar Association,
Division for Bar Services, 1998 Bar Activities Inventory, Table 5, Question Number 81
(asking each state and local bar, “Does the bar have an organized entity (committee,
section, commission) in the following areas: gay/lesbian lawyers?;” and revealing that
only one state bar, Arizona, reported an affirmative answer; and that only seven local
bar associations: the Bar Association of San Francisco, Los Angeles County Bar
Association, Denver Bar Association, Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Philadelphia Bar Association, King County Bar Association, reported an affirmative
answer).
Similarly, the National Center for State Courts, an information
clearinghouse for state court systems, does not compile any data on sexual
orientation bias. Telephone interview with Lorrie Montgomery, Communications
Manager, National Center for State Courts (Oct. 11, 2001).
39. See Hon. Bruce M. Seyla, First Circuit: A Study of Gender Bias in and Around the
Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 647 (1998) (noting that the First Circuit Court of
Appeals completed a comprehensive study of gender bias in 1997, after creating two
independent task forces to address gender and racial bias in 1993); George Lange,
III, Second Circuit: Study of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 703, 703-04
(1998) (observing that in 1993, the Second Circuit created a “Task Force on Gender,
Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts” and completed a comprehensive study on
gender bias in 1997); Hon. Dolores K. Sloviter, Third Circuit: Gender, Race, and
Ethnicity—Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 707, 717
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addressed the issue of bias against homosexuals.

A handful of state

(1998) (reporting that in 1994, the Third Circuit created the “Task Force on Equal
Treatment in the Courts” which presented its findings on gender bias in 1997);
Samuel W. Phillips, Fourth Circuit: The Judicial Council’s Review on the Need for a Gender
Bias Study, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 721, 722 (1998) (stating that the Fourth Circuit
surveyed each of the chief district judges in the circuit, reported its findings to the
Judicial Council and opted not to undertake any “duplicative” studies); Gregory A.
Nussel, Fifth Circuit: Study of Gender Bias, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 723, 724 (1998)
(explaining that the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit opted to “build and learn
from previous studies rather than conduct an additional costly and lengthy study”);
Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Seventh Circuit: Fairness in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
725, 726 (1998) (noting that the Seventh Circuit created the “Race and Gender
Fairness Committee” in 1993); Hon. Lyle E. Strom, Eighth Circuit: Gender Fairness Task
Force, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 731, 731 (1998) (providing that the Eighth Circuit created
a task force on gender bias in 1993, and published the findings of its study in 1997);
John C. Coughenour, Ninth Circuit: The Gender Bias Task Force, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
735, 735 (1998) (indicating that the Ninth Circuit created the “Gender Bias Task
Force” in 1990 and released a the findings of its study in 1993); Hon. David M. Ebel,
Tenth Circuit: Gender Bias Study—Continuing Education and Training, 32 U. RICH. L.
REV. 745, 745 (1998) (noting that the Tenth Circuit created the “Gender Bias Task
Force” and completed a study of gender bias and sexual harassment); Eleventh Circuit:
“Executive Summary”—Report of the Eleventh Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, 32 U. RICH.
L. REV. 751, 751 (1998) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit created its “Task Force on
Gender Bias” in 1993 and completed a comprehensive study); Hon. John Garrett
Penn, D.C. Circuit: Study of Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 765
(1998) (explaining that the District of Columbia Circuit created the “Task Force on
Race and Gender Bias” in 1992 and completed a comprehensive study); see also Hon.
Sharon E. Grubin & Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on
Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 11
(reporting that the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit created a task force to
study and report on the effects of gender, race, and ethnicity on the functions of the
court in 1993); Final Report & Recommendations of the Eighth Circuit Gender Fairness Task
Force, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9, 12 (1997); Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the
D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657, 1657 (1996)
(summarizing the results of the Special Committee); The Effects of Gender in the Federal
Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
745, 745 (1994) (reporting the results of the Task Force). Cf. Jeanette F. Stewart,
Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 1 (1996) (analyzing the results of studies conducted by state task
forces on gender bias within the courts).
40. See Letter from Gary H. Wente, Circuit Executive, U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, First Circuit, to Michael Shortnacy, Staff Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (Sept. 7,
2001) (on file with author) (recognizing that “the First Circuit Task Forces on
Gender, Race and Ethnic bias did not undertake to study perceptions or incidences
of bias against gays or lesbians in the courts of the First Circuit”); Letter from Toby
D. Slawsky, Circuit Executive, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, to
Michael Shortnacy, Staff Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (Sept. 7, 2001) (on file with
author) (confirming that “the Third Circuit has not done a study of bias based on
sexual preference”) (emphasis in original); Letter from Samuel W. Phillips, Circuit
Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, to Michael Shortnacy, Staff
Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (Sept. 7, 2001) (on file with author) (stating that “The
Fourth Circuit has not established a Task Force for undertaking a study of bias
against gays and lesbians in the federal court system.”); Letter from Gregory A.
Nussel, Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, to Michael Shortnacy,
Staff Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with author) (pointing out
that “the Fifth Circuit has declined to make bias, on any basis, an issue for special
study or particularized attention.”); Letter from James A. Higgins, Circuit Executive,
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, to Michael Shortnacy, Staff Member,
Am. U. L. Rev. (Sept. 7, 2001) (on file with author) (acknowledging that the Sixth
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judicial councils and local bar associations, however, have undertaken
studies about bias against homosexuals within their own court
41
systems. These studies overwhelmingly conclude that homosexuals
(whether court employees, attorneys, jurors, court users, or criminal
defendants) face widespread and rampant prejudice within the legal
system. This Part focuses on two of these studies conducted in the
42
state court systems of both California and Arizona.

Circuit has not undertaken any studies on bias based on sexual orientation);
Telephone Interview with Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit (Aug. 15, 2001) (agreeing that the Seventh Circuit has not
undertaken any studies on sexual orientation bias within the courts of that circuit);
Letter from Millie B. Adams, Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, to Michael Shortnacy, Staff Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (Sept. 21, 2001) (on file
with author) (declaring that the Eighth Circuit has not established a formal task
force to study the issue of sexual orientation bias); Letter from Robert E. Rucker,
Asst. Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, to Michael Shortnacy,
Staff Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (November 27, 2001) (on file with author) (conceding
that “the Ninth Circuit’s task forces that have addressed issues of fairness and bias
concerning race, ethnicity, religion, and gender did not directly conduct research on
the perceptions or incidences of bias against gays or lesbians in the courts of the
Ninth Circuit”); Letter from Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, to Michael Shortnacy, Staff Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (Sept.
26, 2001) (on file with author) (confirming that “this circuit has not undertaken a
study of bias involving gays or lesbian in the Tenth Circuit.”); Letter from Jill
Sayenga, Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, to
Michael Shortnacy, Staff Member, Am. U. L. Rev. (Oct. 11, 2001) (on file with
author) (noting that the 1995 report issued by the D.C. Circuit Gender, Race and
Ethnic Bias Task Force does not specifically address sexual orientation bias, and that
two respondents in that survey reported that they did not file a complaint about
sexual orientation that they believed they experienced on the job).
41. See, e.g., Jennifer Durkin, Comment, Queer Studies I: An Examination of the First
Eleven Studies of Sexual Orientation Bias by the Legal Profession, 8 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L. J.
343, 343 (1998) (summarizing the goals, methodology, findings, and
recommendations of the first eleven sexual orientation bias studies conducted);
Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Lesbian and
Gay Identity in the Courts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 565 (2001) (discussing and
analyzing the results of the 2001 California Sexual Orientation Bias Study); see also
Sexual Orientation Fairness in the California Courts: Final Report of the Sexual Orientation
Fairness Subcommittee of the Access and Fairness Advisory Committee (Jan. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/access [hereinafter California
Study] (reporting and analyzing the subcommittee’s research on the issue); Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, Report to the Board of Governors, State Bar of Arizona (Apr. 1999)
(on file with author), Executive Summary, available at http://www.azbar.org/
sections/GayLesbian/summary.asp [hereinafter Arizona Study] (summarizing the
study’s findings, and making recommendations).
42. The California and Arizona studies were chosen for discussion by the author
primarily because they were the most recent and comprehensive studies conducted
by the date of publishing. Only two other statewide studies (Massachusetts and New
Jersey) have been conducted and both reach similar conclusions to those reached in
See Durkin, supra note 41, at 353-54
the California and Arizona studies.
(summarizing “The Prevalence of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Legal Profession
in Massachusetts” study); see also New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Gay and Lesbian
Issues: Final Report, (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us, 63
(concluding that sexual orientation bias influences “to some degree” both the
judicial process and the judicial workplace).
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A. The California Study
In January 2001, the Sexual Orientation Fairness Subcommittee of
the Access and Fairness Advisory Committee of the Judicial Council
of California (the “Fairness Subcommittee”) completed the most
comprehensive study (the “California Study”) of sexual orientation
43
bias within a court system ever undertaken.
The Fairness
Subcommittee elicited feedback from five focus groups consisting of
attorneys conducted in San Jose, San Francisco, San Diego,
44
45
Sacramento, and Los Angeles. It also sent surveys, to two groups of
46
individuals: (1) gay and lesbian court users; and (2) court
47
employees, irrespective of their sexual orientation.
The findings of the Fairness Subcommittee’s study overwhelmingly
demonstrate that homosexual court users, employees, and attorneys
48
in the California court system face a great deal of hostility and bias.
43. The study centered on the State of California’s judicial system, which consists
of: the California Supreme Court; six districts of the Court of Appeal; sixty-four trial
courts. There are 1,580 judgeships in California’s judicial system and approximately
8.8 million cases were filed in the various courts of California in Fiscal Year 1998See California Judicial System, Fact Sheet (June 2000), available at
1999.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/cajudsys.pdf (describing the
California court system). Although the study focused only on analysing the bias
exhibited towards gay males and lesbians and failed to address the bias towards
individuals who identify as themselves transsexual or transgendered, it was
nevertheless the most extensive review of the issue of sexual orientation fairness in
any state court system in the country. See California Study, supra note 41, at 1.
44. See California Study, supra note 41, at 1 (noting that the survey requested that
the attorneys identify barriers facing homosexual legal professionals, as well as
homosexual clients).
45. See California Study, supra note 41, at 12 (noting that fifty-eight percent of the
court user group completed the survey, for a total response of 1,225 court users, and
that 1,525 out of approximately 5,500 court system employees responded).
46. See California Study, supra note 41, at 9 (explaining that the gay and lesbian
court user group was ascertained by utilizing the mailing lists of various national and
local lesbian and gay advocacy and service organizations and by circulating a flier
asking individuals to identify whether they had used the California courts within the
past ten years, and if so, whether they were willing to participate in the survey).
47. See California Study, supra note 41, at 12 (describing the court employee
group as including: court clerks, reporters, administrators, and attorneys). Tellingly,
the court employee survey itself generated a significant amount of negative feedback.
See California Study, supra note 41, at 13. Court employees remarks on the survey
included: “I have received your survey on sexual orientation and found it to be
degrading and offensive . . . I am sure the Judicial Council could find better use of
the talent, time and money that is being wasted on a minority of court personnel.”
And, “[s]ome of us have real jobs—this is a blatant waste of taxpayer money—who
cares about this crap!” Finally, “I can further assure you that, as a court clerk, I have
better things to do than keep track of extraneous remarks regarding gays and
lesbians.” Id. (emphasis in original).
48. See California Study, supra note 41, at 30-31 (noting that twenty-two percent
of the court user group felt threatened in the courtroom because of their sexual
orientation; and reporting responses to the survey which are examples of threats: “I
felt intimidated—didn’t want them [two clerks and a police officer observed by
respondent while in line] to talk about me the way they were talking about other
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For example, fifty-six percent of the responding gay and lesbian court
49
users experienced or observed a “negative comment or action”
50
toward gay men or lesbians. Worse still, “one out of every five court
employees heard derogatory terms, ridicule, snickering, or jokes
about gay men or lesbians in open court, with the comments being
51
made most frequently by judges, lawyers, or court employees.”
The California Study also shows that bias against gays and lesbians
is deeply ingrained in the courtroom culture, thereby making it
difficult to prevent or correct. Many court employees who do witness
bias toward gays and lesbians either fail to act altogether, or take
52
action that, unfortunately, does not change the offending behavior.
In fact, forty-eight percent of court employees seeing either negative
actions or hearing negative comments in open court opted not to
53
Of the court employees who did intervene, only forty
respond.
percent reported their intervention either stopped or decreased the
frequency of the negative comments, and thirty-eight percent
reported that their intervention did not effect the negative comments
54
at all.
Alarmingly, a significant number of gay and lesbian court users feel
threatened in the courtroom setting because of their sexual
55
orientation. It also appears that the sexual orientation of gay and
lesbian court users is often times revealed either against their will or
56
without their knowledge. Fifty-six percent of the responding court
gays—kept my mouth shut.”).
49. The study does not define what constitutes a “negative comment or action.”
See California Study, supra note 41, at 18 (defining other operational terms used
within the study).
50. See California Study, supra note 41, at 3-4 (explaining that the negative
contact most frequently came from a lawyer or court employee, or was an instance in
which sexual orientation became an issue).
51. California Study, supra note 41, at 4.
52. See California Study, supra note 41, at 4 (stating that one explanation for
observers of negative actions or comments not responding more was due to a belief
that nothing constructive would come from their intervention). Author, Martin
Kantor, suggests a response strategy to these comments that is designed to alter the
offending behavior. See MARTIN KANTOR, HOMOPHOBIA: DESCRIPTION, DEVELOPMENT
AND DYNAMICS OF GAY BASHING 200 (1998) (suggesting “passive-aggressive
counterstrikes” as the best response homophobic conduct).
53. See California Study, supra note 41, at 4.
54. See California Study, supra note 41, at 4.
55. See California Study, supra note 41, at 4 (observing that thirty-eight percent of
respondents reported feeling threatened by the courtroom setting because of their
sexual orientation).
56. See California Study, supra note 41, at 4. Also, it is important to note that one
way in which court users’ sexual orientation may be revealed against their will is by
questioning from the judge, prosecutor, or defense attorney in voir dire. See Heather
C. Brunelli, Note, The Double Bind: Unequal Treatment For Homosexuals Within the
American Legal Framework, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 201, 228 (2000) (discussing the
practicalities of asking jurors in voir dire about their sexual orientation versus asking

SHORTNACYPP

2001]

1/24/02 6:00 PM

GUILTY AND GAY

325

users reported that during a contact with a court where their sexual
orientation became an issue, they had not desired to disclose their
57
sexual orientation.
Twenty-nine percent of these respondents
believed that someone else disclosed their sexual orientation without
58
their approval.
The California Study demonstrates that the courtroom is often not
only a hostile environment for gay and lesbian litigants and jurors, it
59
can also be a hostile work environment for gay and lesbian court
60
employees. Within an environment of hostility, there also appears
to be a code of silence among gay and lesbian court employees who
61
In fact, forty-two
refrain from challenging the biased behavior.
percent of responding court employees who experienced a negative
incident at work based on their sexual orientation took no action in
62
response. Of those employees that did take some action, forty-nine
them about their views on homosexuality in general); Paul R. Lynd, Comment, Juror
Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and
Peremptories, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 231, 287 (1998) (concluding that constitutional
privacy interests provide some protection against compelled disclosure of sexual
orientation in voir dire). Courts remain divided on whether the exclusion of jurors
on the basis of their sexual orientation is constitutionally prohibited. See Laurie L.
Levenson, Jury Selection, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 3, 2000, at A17 (explaining that while the
United States Supreme Court prohibited the racial stereotyping of jurors in Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and prohibited peremptory challenges based on gender
discrimination in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the Court has
not decided on whether to extend those protections to homosexual jurors); see also
People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 347-48 (2000) (holding that sexual orientation
should also be a protected class for jury selection purposes); Jennifer Warren,
California and the West: New Law Bars Anti-Gay Bias in Jury Selection, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
2000, at A3 (reporting that California Governor Gray Davis signed a bill into law
barring the exclusion of gays and lesbians from juries solely because of their sexual
orientation).
57. See California Study, supra note 41, at 4, 29 (noting that the survey found that
the court user group felt that their sexual orientation was raised as an issue in a court
proceeding when it was not relevant almost as often as when it was relevant; and
concluding that “[o]ne might speculate that sometimes sexual orientation is being
used as a litigation strategy by lawyers, and that judges should be ready to
appropriately address this issue in the courtroom.”).
58. See California Study, supra note 41, at 4, 28-29 (concluding from this statistic
that California courts must be prepared to address sexual orientation issues in a
court contact even when it is not pertinent to the proceeding).
59. See California Study, supra note 41, at 35. Here, the study is generally
referring to a work environment that is hostile toward homosexuals, rather than
using the term “hostile work environment” as it applies in the context of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2001) (listing the elements
of a hostile work environment as “evidence of conduct ‘severe or pervasive enough’
to create ‘an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive;’”
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
60. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (revealing that forty-eight percent of
the court employee respondents who witnessed negative actions or comments chose
not to take action in response).
62. See California Study, supra note 41, at 33 (finding that twenty-five percent of
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percent reported that their intervention or action had no effect on
63
the offending behavior. Additionally, one in five lesbian and gay
64
court employees reported experiencing discrimination at work
65
based on their sexual orientation. Sixty-five percent of the court
employees who experienced discrimination based on their sexual
orientation took some action; however, fifty-six percent reported that
66
nothing resulted from that action.
Disturbingly, twenty-nine
percent of court employee respondents reported the perception that
67
it is unsafe for employees to be open about being a gay or lesbian.
B. The Arizona Study
The State Bar of Arizona Board of Governors (the “Arizona
Board”) established a Gay and Lesbian Task Force in 1997 to
determine whether gays and lesbians interacting with Arizona judicial
68
system faced discrimination. In 1999, the Arizona Board created a
69
standing committee on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.
The committee prepared a study (the “Arizona Study”) that surveyed
70
71
72
Arizona judges, attorneys, law students, and members of the gay
the respondents who experienced a negative incident at work responded by
confronting the person responsible for the negative comment; twenty-one percent
discussed the incident with a co-worker other than the perpetrator; ten percent
talked to someone else).
63. See California Study, supra note 41, at 6 (explaining that the acts had no effect
on the offensive behavior).
64. The study does not define the term discrimination. See California Study, supra
note 41, at 6 (noting that the study does differentiate discrimination from negative
comments or actions).
65. See California Study, supra note 41, at 6 (contrasting the responses of the two
percent of heterosexual court employees who reported discrimination based on
sexual orientation).
66. See California Study, supra note 41, at 6 (noting that of the court employees
who reported experiencing discrimination based on their sexual orientation but took
no action, forty-six percent refrained from doing so because they thought that
nothing constructive would result; twenty-three percent reported taking no action
out of fear of negative consequences).
67. See California Study, supra note 41, at 7, 37-38 (emphasis added) (failing to
explicitly define “unsafe” as it was perceived by the court employee survey
respondents).
68. See Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Committee Statement of
available
at
Purpose,
http://www.azbar.org/Sections/GayLesbian/home.asp
(explaining the mission of the Committee).
69. See id. (noting that the creation of the Standing Committee on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity was requested by the previously created Gay and
Lesbian Task Force).
70. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 8 (explaining that the Task Force mailed
questionnaires to each full time state court judge in the State of Arizona; twenty-nine
percent of those judges surveyed responded).
71. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 8 (reporting that the Task Force
randomly selected 452 attorneys listed in the State Bar of Arizona’s membership
database; twenty-nine percent of those attorneys surveyed responded).
72. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 8-9 (noting that the Task Force
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and lesbian community about sexual orientation bias within the
court system and the legal profession. Much like the California
75
Study, the results of the Arizona Study indicated that Arizona
courtrooms were hostile places for gay and lesbian litigants, court
76
users, attorneys, judges, and employees.
According to the Arizona Study, seventy-seven percent of judges
77
and attorneys reported that they had heard disparaging comments
78
about gays and lesbians. Forty-seven percent of those who reported
hearing these remarks heard them in public spaces of the
79
courthouse.
Twenty-nine percent of lesbian and gay court
employees report that they have heard “negative remarks” about gays
80
and lesbians.
Thirteen percent of judges and attorneys have
81
observed negative treatment by judges in open court toward those
82
perceived to be gay or lesbian.

distributed 465 surveys to the University of Arizona Law School with twenty-two
percent of those law students responding; the Task Force also distributed 476 surveys
to the Arizona State Law School with twelve percent responding).
73. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 8-9 (explaining that the Task Force
distributed 800 surveys to members of the gay and lesbian community at “gayfriendly” churches, in “gay newspapers,” at “lesbian and gay cultural events,” and to
members of the gay and lesbian chambers of commerce; fifty-one percent of those
surveyed responded).
74. The Arizona Study does not define “sexual orientation bias.” Using the
survey questions themselves as context, it appears that like the California Study, the
Arizona Task Force did not include transgendered or transsexual people in its
survey. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at apps. I-IV (providing the actual
questionnaires that the Task Force used for each survey group).
75. See discussion supra Part I.A.
76. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 18 (stating that the results provide
“evidence that lesbians, gays, and bisexuals are at a substantial disadvantage whether
working in the justice system or gaining access to the justice system”).
77. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. I (defining disparaging comments as
“ridicule, jokes, snickering etc. . .”).
78. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 18 (suggesting that the findings indicate
that negative speech regarding gays and lesbians is the most commonly perceived
form of anti-homosexual bias in the courthouse, and that it is pervasive).
Significantly, fifteen percent of those judges and attorneys surveyed agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement “homosexuality is wrong.” See Arizona Study, supra
note 41, at 24.
79. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 18.
80. The Arizona Study does not define the term “negative remarks.” See Arizona
Study, supra note 41, at app. I (asking “[h]ow often have you heard negative remarks
about lesbian or gay people arising out of a particular case?”).
81. The Arizona Study does not define the term “negative treatment.” See Arizona
Study, supra note 41, at app. II (asking “[h]ow often have you seen or heard negative
treatment by judges of those perceived to be lesbian or gay who are before the
court?”). See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. III (asking “[h]ow often have you
seen or heard negative treatment by professors, staff, or students of those perceived
to be lesbian or gay?”).
82. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 20 (noting that thirty percent of judges
and attorneys agree or very much agree that lesbians and gays are discriminated
against within the legal profession).
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Perhaps most surprisingly, judges and attorneys reported a lack of
83
84
85
knowledge about the statutes, case law, judicial canons, and
86
ethical rules that prohibit discrimination based on sexual
87
orientation. Sixty percent of judges indicated they had little to no
knowledge about statutes or case law protecting gay and lesbian
88
people. Sixty-three percent of judges also said that they were not
very knowledgeable or not knowledgeable at all about legislation
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
89
orientation. Twenty-one percent of judges responded that they were
not very knowledgeable or had no knowledge about judicial canons
90
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The attorneys surveyed demonstrated an even greater lack of
awareness and information than the surveyed judges about sexual
orientation as it relates to Arizona law. Only six percent reported
that they were familiar with any case law in Arizona prohibiting
91
Only thirteen percent
discrimination against gays and lesbians.
83. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 13 (highlighting the presence of PHOENIX
CITY CODE, ART. II, § 188-10.01 and PHOENIX ORDINANCE NOS. G-3485, 3558 which
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination by Phoenix vendors, suppliers, or
contractors employing more than thirty-five people, and TUCSON CITY CODE, CH. 17,
ART. II, §§ 17-1–17-16 that prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in public and
private employment, in housing, and in places of public accommodation); see also
Myers, supra note 12 (compiling and categorizing all municipalities with antidiscrimination laws that include sexual orientation).
84. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 12 (describing the case law that provides
“legal prohibitions against discrimination by private lawyers in [Arizona]” including
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 627-28 (1991); Blain v. Golden State Container, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 94-1012,
slip op. at 3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)).
85. See Brown, supra note 17 and accompanying text (pointing out that Arizona
has adopted the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
3(B)(5)); see also Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 12 (noting that Arizona has also
adopted JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3(B)(6) as well as R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4,
Comment 2 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT).
86. See Brown, supra note 17 (observing that the U.S. District Court and the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona have specific court rules prohibiting
prejudicial conduct directed against homosexuals).
87. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 29, app. I (highlighting the results of the
survey questions given to Arizona judges).
88. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. I (asking judges, at question 43, to
rate their knowledge on a scale of one to five, one being not knowledgeable and five
being very knowledgeable, of statutes or case law relating to homosexual people).
This statistic is surprising, as presumably there exists a tendency on the part of judges
and attorneys to over-report their knowledge of the law in survey responses.
89. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. I (asking judges to rate their
knowledge of legislation prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation using a scale of one being not knowledgeable and five being very
knowledgeable).
90. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. I (discussing the results of the
question).
91. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. I (asking attorneys if they were aware
of any case law in Arizona that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation).
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reported awareness of any ethical rules prohibiting sexual orientation
92
discrimination.
Worse still, sixteen percent of the attorney
respondents reported that they were aware of Arizona state statutes
that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, even
93
though no such statutes exist.
The Arizona Study also revealed that Arizona law schools were
94
hostile environments for gays and lesbians. There is a dearth of
95
awareness in Arizona law schools regarding gay and lesbian issues.
Only seventeen percent of law students surveyed have attended
classes specifically designed to address issues involving gays and
96
Law students are also misinformed about the laws
lesbians.
designed to protect gays and lesbians as illustrated by the finding that
seventeen percent of law student respondents mistakenly reported
that there were Arizona state statutes that prohibit discrimination
97
based on sexual orientation. Furthermore, only eight percent of law
students surveyed reported awareness of case law prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation—over half of them
98
admitted that their knowledge was limited. Even more troubling,
only one percent of law students reported an awareness of the various
99
judicial and ethical canons prohibiting bias against homosexuals.
C. Conclusions
The results of these two studies indicate that bias against and
ignorance about homosexuals within the court systems of California
and Arizona are both rampant and widespread. Both studies strongly
recommend education and training for members of the legal
community in order to combat sexual orientation bias in the
100
courthouse.
They also recommend that the court systems, as
92. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 29.
93. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. I.
94. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 21, 30 (finding that thirty-eight percent of
law student respondents reported that they had witnessed a negative preference, one
quarter of these reports concerned hearing students indicate a preference not to
take a class from a lesbian or gay professor, and students not wanting to work with a
lesbian or gay peer).
95. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
96. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at app. III (asking law students if they have
ever attended a class, seminar, or presentation specifically designed to address gay
and/or lesbian issues).
97. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 3.
98. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 30.
99. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 30.
100. See California Study, supra note 41, at 39-42 (recommending that the Center
for Judicial Education and Research and the Access and Fairness Advisory
Committee, along with the Administrative Office of the Courts, develop methods to
familiarize judges and non-judicial court personnel with California and federal laws
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employers, should establish personnel policies that eliminate sexual
101
orientation discrimination and foster workplace equality. The two
studies’ most important recommendation, however, is for further
102
research.
With only four statewide studies ever conducted on the
103
issue of sexual orientation bias in the courts, the full extent of this
kind of discrimination is largely unknown. A philosophical and
financial commitment by the legal community as a whole, including
104
105
106
court systems, professional organizations, and law schools, is
relating to sexual orientation fairness and nondiscrimination). The California study
also recomends that programs be implemented to develop and provide information,
training, and education for all persons concerning sexual orientation. Id. Finally,
the report recommends that the Judicial Administration Institute of California
should incorporate the findings and recommendations of this report into their
educational programs for the bench officers and court staff. Id.
The Arizona Study recommends that the Arizona Bar sponsor and support
Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) seminars specifically targeting gay and lesbian
issues, and that the CLE Department include gay/lesbian issues, as appropriate, in
every seminar. See Arizona Study, supra note 41, at 33-42. The Arizona study also
recommends that gay/lesbian issues and discrimination prohibitions should be
specifically included in the Sate Bar Course on Lawyer Professionalism, required of
all attorneys; and that judges should have similar training before taking the bench,
and periodically thereafter. Id. Finally, the Arizona study recomends that the two
law schools in Arizona provide an atmosphere of support and growth to gay and
lesbian student groups. Id.
101. The California study encourages state and local courts to “[endorse] the
development and implementation of local court personnel policies and practices to
eliminate sexual orientation discrimination and bias in the court as a workplace,
including effective intervention in incidents of sexual orientation discrimination or
bias and the prevention of retaliation against any individual reporting such incidents.
See California Study, supra note 41, at 39.
The Arizona study encourages state and local courts to adopt, implement, and
publicize a non-discrimination policy that includes sexual orientation and
encouraging (1) non-discriminatory recruitment and hiring of qualified employees;
(2) the promotion of a workplace climate that ensures equal employment
opportunities for gay employees; and (3) providing gay employees and their samesex domestic partners with employee benefits comparable to those provided to
heterosexual employees and their opposite-sex spouses. Arizona Study, supra note
41, at 37-39.
102. See California Study, supra note 41, at 42 (declaring that the advisory
committee will undertake data and information collection to develop baseline data
on the current state of the court’s ability to respond to sexual orientation, gender
identification, and gender expression issues; and that the advisory committee will
track the implementation of all recommendations made by this committee); Arizona
Study, supra note 41, at 36 (affirming the State Bar’s commitment in “[supporting]
the Task Force in completing surveys of the police and of court personnel and in
reporting the findings of those surveys in a supplement to this Report”).
103. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the statewide studies
and the inattention that sexual orientation bias receives from the American Bar
Association, the National Center for State Courts, and federal judiciary).
104. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the federal court
system’s inattention to the issue of sexual orientation bias).
105. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (revealing that neither the
American Bar Association or the National Center for State Courts compiles
information on sexual orientation bias in the various court systems).
106. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of law school
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necessary to ensure that sexual orientation bias no longer results in
107
the unequal application of already hostile laws.
A fuller discussion and a clearer picture of the prevalence and
extent of sexual orientation bias in the courtroom, although crucial,
are only the first steps in addressing a systemic problem that exacts
huge tolls on homosexual criminal defendants. As Part II of this
Comment argues, the most egregious impact of sexual orientation
bias in the courtroom actually evades statistical quantification.
Indeed, sexual orientation bias is often a vehicle by which
prosecutors seek to solidify the chance of securing a death sentence
from the jury of sexual orientation bias by prosecutors to secure
executions.
II. DEATH PENALTY CASES
Professor Jennifer Gerarda Brown devised a helpful framework for
categorizing judicial bias against homosexual criminal defendants
108
within the legal system. Although Professor Brown’s framework
appears designed to describe the bias exhibited by judges against
homosexuals, her framework is also adequate for dealing with bias in
the courtroom exhibited by another key player, the prosecuting
109
attorney.
Professor Brown establishes three categories of bias:
(1) normative bias, (2) positive bias, and (3) disrespectful
110
According to Brown, normative bias occurs when
references.
feelings about homosexuality cause judicial actors to misinterpret the
law—injecting sexual orientation into an issue when it is not
111
relevant. Positive bias occurs when the judicial actor’s assumptions
about homosexuality leads them to describe a particular gay or
curricula in Arizona about the legal issues that affect homosexual people). See
generally Duncan, supra note 17, at 163-77 (discussing the state of curricula dealing
with sexual orientation in the U.S. News & World Report “top eleven” ranked law
schools).
107. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing the various state and
federal statues that, inter alia, ban same-sex marriages and criminally sanction
consensual sex between adults of the same gender, and listing the states that have
pending legislation to ban same-sex marriages).
108. See Brown, supra note 17, at 379 (explaining that the increased use of the
state courts by homosexual litigants has resulted in the discovery of anti-gay bias
within the court system).
109. See Brown, supra note 17, at 378 (defining the Brown framework as
“identifying judicial behavior troubling enough that it can be said to manifest bias or
prejudice”).
110. See Brown, supra note 17, at 379 (asserting that judicial bias against
homosexual litigants and defendants is demonstrated through ideas and emotions as
well as behavior).
111. See Brown, supra note 17, at 379 (explaining that normative bias also occurs
in cases where the statutes or common law provide judges discretion to consider
sexual orientation, and where the judge decides to consider it).
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lesbian litigant inaccurately by using stereotypes and popular
112
misconceptions.
Finally,
disrespectful
references
toward
homosexual litigants occur when the judicial actors broadcast their
bias through words and actions, even though the references may not
113
necessarily affect the legal outcome of the case.
Brown’s typology is particularly useful in identifying distinct kinds
114
of biased behavior and, more importantly, the ramifications of this
115
behavior in the context of legal outcomes for criminal defendants.
This Comment applies Brown’s framework to the death penalty cases
116
discussed below, and concludes that prosecutors can shape legal
117
outcomes with their biased behavior.
Indeed, as each of the
following cases demonstrates, the prosecutor’s biased behavior even
has the potential to exact the most severe punishment available to the
118
state: execution.
A. Normative Bias: Prosecutors Importing Sexual Orientation as a Legal
Issue When it is Not Relevant.
1.

119

The case of Stanley Lingar
On the evening of January 5, 1985, twenty-two-year-old Stanley
Lingar and a friend, eighteen-year-old David Smith, were drinking
112. See Brown, supra note 17, at 379 (noting that positive bias also occurs when
judicial actors “rely upon flawed empiricism about homosexuality or allow valid
evidence about the gay community as a whole to outweigh evidence regarding the
individual litigants before them”).
113. See Brown, supra note 17, at 379 (stating that disrespectful bias is the most
common form of bias).
114. See Brown, supra note 17, at 380-436 (identifying disrespectful bias, positive
bias, and normative bias). Specifically, Brown explains that bias is an internal or
subjective process with external or objective manifestations. See id. (noting that bias
can be manifested through words (disrespectful bias), perceptions (positive bias), or
application of law (normative bias)).
115. See id. (discussing how judicial bias results in tainted proceedings). The
ramifications of biased judicial behavior are evident in the three forms of bias
discussed by Brown. See Brown, supra note 17, at 380-436. Brown provides the
following examples of each type of bias. Disrespetful bias is the use of negative terms
by judges that may reveal the judges’ personal bias against homosexuals, as well as
influence other judicial decision-makers such as the prosecutor or jury. Id. Positive
bias can result when the decision-making and fact-finding process of the judge, jury,
or prosecutor itself is distorted by their view of sexual orientation. Id. Finally,
normative bias occurs when the actual application of the law is be tainted by the
judge’s, prosecutor’s, jury’s sexual orientation bias. Id.
116. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
117. See infra Part III.
118. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
119. See State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1987) (affirming the defendant’s
convictions and death sentence); Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, Lingar v. Luebbers, 529 U.S. 1039 (2000) (affirming the District Court’s
denial of Lingar’s petition for writ of habeas corpus).
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and driving around Doniphan, Missouri.
While driving down a
rural highway, the two saw a Jeep parked on the side of the road with
121
its hood up.
The Jeep’s driver, sixteen-year-old Scott Allen,
122
informed them he had run out of gas. Lingar offered to drive Allen
123
to a gas station, and Allen got into the car with the two men.
After driving to several gas stations, all of which were closed, Lingar
drove out of town to a nearby lake and instructed Allen to remove his
124
Once Allen was naked, Lingar ordered him to
clothing.
125
126
masturbate.
When Allen did not comply, Lingar drove to his
parents’ house with Smith and Allen where he retrieved a twenty-two127
Lingar then drove back to the lake and
caliber Winchester rifle.
128
again ordered Allen to masturbate.
Allen asked permission to
129
urinate, and as Allen stood urinating, Lingar shot him. Allen fell to
his knees and attempted to escape by pulling himself into the car and
130
starting the ignition. Lingar then shot Allen in the head and Allen
131
fell out of the driver’s side door. Lingar walked over to Allen and
132
shot him two more times.
Seeing that Allen was still alive, Lingar
133
took a tire iron from the trunk and repeatedly hit him.
As Allen
120. Lingar, 176 F.3d at 455 (stating that Smith testified that Lingar drank thirty
cans of beer, a quart of beer, and a half bottle of wine the day of Allen’s murder). It
is important to note that the “facts” of the case, as established in Lingar’s various
appellate court decisions, are simply recitations of David Smith’s trial testimony. See
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5, Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 963609) [hereinafter Lingar, Appellant’s Brief] (quoting the trial testimony of David
Smith).
121. See Lingar, 176 F.3d at 455.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. (establishing that initially Lingar only told Allen to take off his winter
coat, but then continued to instruct Allen to remove additional layers of clothing).
125. See id.
126. See Lingar, 176 F.3d at 455 (stating that Allen was too frightened to
masturbate). When when Allen refused Lingar’s request, Lingar threatened to
abandon him and not drive him back to his Jeep. Id.
127. See id. at 456 (stating that a gun expert later testified that the bullets found in
Allen could have been fired from Lingar’s rifle).
128. See id. at 455 (stating that when Lingar returned with the rifle he said to Allen
“[n]ow I’ll bet you’re going to do what I say without arguing.”).
129. See id. (explaining that when Allen asked permission to urinate, the three
men got out of the Jeep).
130. See id.
131. See Lingar, 176 F.3d at 456 (stating that a blood expert testified that the blood
stains in Lingar’s car could have been Allen’s blood).
132. See id. at 457.
133. See id. at 456 (stating that Allen struggled onto his hands and knees after
being shot four times and hit with a tire iron). Expert medical testimony, however,
contradicts David Smith’s version of Scott Allen’s death. See Lingar, Appellant’s Brief,
supra note 120, at 5 (detailing testimony by the medical examiner who performed
the autopsy that contradicted this version of the events on January 5, 1985,
specifically, that the cause of death was the first bullet wound to the chest). This
alternative theory of death was supported at the sentencing hearing. See Lingar,
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struggled to his knees, Lingar backed up the automobile and struck
134
Allen with the bumper. Lingar and Smith put Allen’s body into the
135
136
trunk, drove to a nearby river, and threw the body into the water.
Lingar and Smith worked diligently the following day to conceal
137
evidence of the murder. Several days after Allen’s death, both men
138
returned to Doniphan at the request of authorities.
Lingar and
Smith both gave statements to the police who later recovered the car,
139
the gun, and the body. The State of Missouri charged the two men
140
with first-degree murder.
In a plea agreement with prosecutors,
Smith agreed to testify at Lingar’s trial in return for the state
141
dropping the first-degree murder charge against him.
142
The jury convicted Lingar of first-degree murder.
The
prosecutor’s strategy of using Lingar’s homosexuality against him
became apparent in the opening argument of the penalty phase of
143
the trial.
The prosecutor stated, “The only evidence we’ll have to
offer you at this stage, we’ll recall David Smith, who will basically tell
you that . . . from . . . April of 1984 until the time of this homicide[,]
there was a homosexual relationship that existed between [him and
144
The defense counsel objected to this statement and
Lingar].”
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 120, at 5 (stating that the Boone County pathologist,
who reviewed the medical examiner’s report, testified that it was his medical opinion
that Smith’s account that Lingar struck Allen repeatedly with the tire iron and with
bumper of the car was inconsistent with the medical evidence).
134. See Lingar, 176 F.3d at 456. Lingar and Smith then drove to Lingar’s
brother’s house, where his brother advised them to dispose of the body and to cover
up the bloody snow. Id.
135. See id. (explaining that after placing Allen’s body into the trunk Lingar and
Smith in fact kicked clean snow over the bloody snow).
136. See id. (observing that Lingar and Smith threw Allen’s body into the river in
an attempt to conceal the murder).
137. See id. (explaining that Lingar and Smith returned to Lingar’s parents’ house
and cleaned the car; and that they pawned the car to a salvage dealer, and disposed
of the rifle on a country road on their way to Bowling Green, Kentucky).
138. See id. at 456 (recounting the sequence of events following the murder).
139. See Lingar, 176 F.3d at 456 (summarizing the connections between Lingar’s
rifle and the gun used in the murder).
140. See id.
141. See id. (noting that Smith pled guilty to second-degree murder, and was
sentenced to ten years in prison).
142. See id. (indicating the jury deliberated and rendered a guilty verdict); see also
Lingar, Appellant’s Brief, supra note 120, at 1 (pointing out that the guilt phase of
the trial only lasted two days).
143. See Lingar, Appellant’s Brief, supra note 120, at 6 (explaining that the
prosecutor’s opening argument in the penalty phase was the first attempt to bring
this issue before the jury); see also Lingar, 176 F.3d at 458 (rejecting the argument
that Lingar argued in his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eight Circuit:
that introducing evidence of his sexual orientation at the penalty phase was uniquely
harmful as Lingar was deprived of the ability to “explain or rebut the evidence or to
voir dire the jury on their attitudes toward homosexuality before trial”).
144. Lingar, 176 F.3d at 457.
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145

requested a bench conference.
The trial judge overruled the
146
objection and Smith was called to testify.
When the prosecutor
147
asked Smith about his relationship with Lingar, Smith responded
148
that he had a consensual homosexual relationship with Lingar.
Outwardly, the prosecutor justified eliciting Smith’s testimony about
Lingar’s homosexuality to establish that Lingar’s motive in killing
149
Allen was to keep his sexual orientation a secret, however, the
prosecutor never asked Smith if their relationship was in fact known
150
to others. The jury returned a verdict sentencing Lingar to death
based upon two aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murder was
outrageously wanton, vile, and horrible; and (2) that the murder
151
happened during a kidnapping.
In his appeal before the Missouri Supreme Court, Lingar raised the
issue that the trial judge improperly admitted testimony about his
152
sexual orientation at his sentencing hearing.
The Missouri
Supreme Court recognized that, in the sentencing phase, trial courts
traditionally have discretion to admit any evidence that it deems
153
helpful to the jury in assessing punishment. In finding that the trial
145. See id. (noting that at a bench conference, defense counsel asked the court to
prohibit the state from introducing any evidence of a homosexual relationship
because the evidence was irrelevant, immaterial, highly prejudicial, and
inflammatory). The state responded that the evidence was relevant because it
showed one of the circumstances of the crime and it provided an aspect of Lingar’s
character. See id. (noting that the state also argued that keeping his homosexuality
secret was a motive in the murder of Allen). The trial judge overruled Lingar’s
objection.
146. See id. (stating that court found that the evidence was relevant given the facts
of the crime).
147. See State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 739 (Mo. 1987) (revealing that among
other things, the prosecutor asked Smith: (1) the type of relationship he had with
Lingar; (2) how long it lasted; and (3) whether it continued during the periods they
lived together).
148. See Lingar, 176 F.3d at 457 (noting that Smith testified that he and Lingar
were involved in a sexual relationship from April 1984 until the time of the crime).
149. See Lingar, Appellant’s Brief, supra note 120, at 12 (rejecting the prosecutor’s
proffered explanation that “[Lingar] realized that to let Scott Allen go would
suddenly bring into evidence that he was a homosexual . . . .”). Significantly, the
prosecutor did not ask Smith if his relationship was a secret or whether others knew
that Lingar was a homosexual. See id.
150. See Lingar, Appellant’s Brief, supra note 120, at 12-13 (arguing that the
prosecutor’s justification was a pretext to introduce prejudicial evidence that would
“influence a homophobic jury from a rural area” because the prosecutor made no
effort to link the homosexual relationship to the crime).
151. See Lingar, Appellant’s Brief, supra note 120, at 7 (indicating that the jury
found that “the murder of Thomas Scott Allen involved torture and depravity of
mind”).
152. See Lingar, 726 S.W.2d at 739 (outlining Lingar’s argument on direct appeal
that admission of evidence pertaining to his sexual conduct was irrelevant and
prejudicial, thus requiring a new trial).
153. See id. (citing State v. Malone, 694 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1165 (1986)) (concluding that whether the trial court abused its discretion
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court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the testimony, the
Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that Smith’s testimony regarding
his homosexual relationship with Lingar was relevant to the jury’s
154
consideration of both the “character of the defendant” and the
155
circumstances of the crime.
According to the court, Lingar’s
homosexuality tended to “explain [his] desire to force a young man
156
not only to remove his clothing but also to see him masturbate.”
Lingar appealed the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision to the
157
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court framed the issue as
“whether there is a reasonable probability that the homosexuality
158
evidence might have contributed to Lingar’s death sentence.” The
Eighth Circuit assumed arguendo that the evidence of Lingar’s
159
homosexuality and his relationship with Smith was not admissible,
yet nonetheless concluded that the introduction of this evidence was
160
harmless error. The court reasoned that because Smith’s testimony
in the sentencing phase was brief and because the prosecutor did not
refer to Lingar’s homosexuality during the closing argument, it was
clear that the admission of the evidence did not contribute to the
161
jury’s finding. The court, stressing the appalling facts of the crime
and the absence of “compelling” mitigating circumstances, ultimately
held that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission
of evidence of Lingar’s homosexuality did not contribute to the jury’s

is the standard of review).
154. See Lingar, 726 S.W.2d at 739. The Missouri Supreme Court’s reasoning here
erroneously imports Lingar’s sexual orientation as relevant evidence—purportedly
going to the nature of the crime and to the character of the defendant.
155. See id. See also supra note 149-50 and accompanying text (questioning the
prosecutor’s motive for introducing the evidence of sexual orientation to prove that
Lingar needed to keep his homosexuality secret, even though the prosecutor never
asked nor proved that Lingar’s sexual orientation was in fact kept a secret).
156. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d at 739. The Court’s reasoning here is an example of
positive bias, where the Court actually ascribes to Lingar the desire to see young boys
masturbate because of his homosexuality. See also infra Part II.B (illustrating positive
bias in the case of Wanda Jean Allen where the prosecutor ascribes to a lesbian
criminal defendant the characteristic of the aggressor or “man” in her relationship).
157. See Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Linger v.
Luebbers, 529 U.S. 1039 (2000) (noting that Stanley Lingar appealed the Missouri
Supreme Court decision in State v. Lingar).
158. See id. (citing Olsen v. Class, 164 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 1999)).
159. See id. at 458 (explaining that even though the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the evidence was admissible and never determined whether it was harmful, the
reviewing court could make a determination of harmlessness on collateral review).
160. See id. (concluding that the jury found that aggravating circumstances
existed, and that the admission of evidence about Lingar’s sexuality was not a
significant factor in the jury’s verdict).
161. See id. (noting that the court also dismissed Lingar’s argument that by
introducing evidence about his homosexuality, the prosecutor invited the jury to find
the “depravity of mind” aggravating circumstance).
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162

death verdict. On February 7, 2001, at 12:01 a.m., Stanley Lingar,
age thirty-seven, was executed by lethal injection at the State of
163
Missouri’s Potosi Correctional Center.
2.

164

The case of Jay Wesley Neill
During the fall of 1984, Jay Wesley Neill and Robert Grady Johnson
165
were involved in a homosexual relationship.
The men began to
166
As their financial troubles grew
experience financial difficulties.
167
worse,
Neill and Johnson, who shared a checking account,
frequently attempted to resolve their money problems at a local
168
bank. Neill commented on several occasions how easy it would be
169
to rob the bank.
In the days and hours that led up to the robbery, Neill and Johnson
170
took steps to prepare for the crime and their escape. Shortly after

162. See Lingar, 176 F.3d at 458 (explaining that even though the jury instructions
asked the jurors to determine whether “the murder of . . . Allen involved torture or
depravity of mind . . . ,” the fact that the prosecutor never explicitly referred to
depravity of mind meant that the jury found the aggravating circumstance to exist
because the nature of the crime was “wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman”). Part III
of this Comment critiques the abstract re-weighing of the evidence as determined at
trial against the prosecutor’s remarks at the sentencing hearing.
163. See Man Who Killed Teen is Executed; Holdeu, High Court Rejected Appeals, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2001, at B3 (explaining that Missouri Governor Bob
Holdeu denied clemency to Lingar, and that the denial was the first death penalty
decision made by the governor since he took office); Missouri Gay Killer Executed
Despite Protests, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at A19 (indicating that forty demonstrators
protested outside the prison while Lingar was executed); Gill Donovan, Death Watch,
NAT’L CATHOLIC REPORTER, Feb. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL 8697323 (reporting
the time and date of Lingar’s death); Missouri Executes Inmate for Murder of a Teenager,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2337190 (reporting that
Lingar was executed by lethal injection).
164. Neill v. Gibson, 263 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, Neill v. Oklahoma, 516 U.S. 1080 (1996).
165. See Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537, 543 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that the
two men shared an apartment in Lawton, Oklahoma).
166. See id. (explaining that the two men attempted to cut expenses by sharing the
apartment with Rhonda Neff and her husband, and that Neff agreed to purchase
groceries while Neill and Johnson paid the rent).
167. See id. (indicating that Neill eventually fell behind on the rent and utility
payments; and observing that the telephone service was discontinued to the
apartment, and that Neill purchased a car with a loan, which quickly became
delinquent).
168. See id. at 543-44 (remarking that Neill sought financial assistance with their
debt from their local bank).
169. See id. at 544 (revealing that their bank was a small facility that usually had
only two tellers and no surveillance cameras or guards).
170. See Neill, 896 P.2d at 544 (stating that on December 13, 1984, Neill and
Johnson purchased two hunting knives at a local discount store, and talked to a travel
agent at the Lawton Municipal Airport about booking a flight to San Francisco,
California; and observing that on December 14, 1984, the two men picked up a gun
permit, which they had applied for earlier, and purchased a thirty-two-caliber
revolver from a pawnshop).
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one o’clock in the afternoon on December 14, 1984, Neill went to the
171
bank and encountered three employees.
He ordered them into a
back room, forced them to lie face down on the floor, and proceeded
172
to stab them to death. A patron entered the bank, found that the
173
teller windows were empty, and looked toward the back room. The
customer went outside to tell her husband that she thought the bank
174
was being robbed.
She and her husband, who was carrying their
fourteen-month-old daughter, went inside the bank to check things
175
out.
Another bank customer followed them inside, where Neill
greeted them with his gun, herded them into the back room, and
176
At that point, yet another
forced them to lie down on the floor.
customer entered the bank, and Neill forced her to lie down in the
177
Neill shot the four adult customers in the
back room as well.
178
head.
179
Neill and Johnson escaped and flew to San Francisco where they
180
The Federal Bureau of
spent portions of the robbery’s proceeds.
Investigation arrested Neill and Johnson three days later in San
181
Francisco.
182
At trial, Neill never contested his guilt.
During the sentencing
phase, however, he proffered evidence of a mitigating factor, namely,
“that he was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance . . . as a
171. See id. at 544 n.2 (revealing that “the evidence as to whether Robert Johnson
accompanied [Neill] into the bank is controverted;” and that Neill testified at
sentencing that Johnson was at home waiting on him during the robbery).
172. See id. at 544.
173. See id. (observing that the bank patron, Bellen Robles, looked down the
hallway and noticed a man bending over something, then went outside to get her
husband).
174. See id.
175. See Neill, 896 P.2d at 544.
176. See id. at 544-45.
177. See id. at 545.
178. See Neill v. Gibson, 263 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that one of
the bank customers who was lying on the floor, Bellen Robles’ husband, had to turn
his head during the shooting to keep the blood out of his eyes and, further, that he
also saw the gun pointed at his baby daughter and heard a click—the gun was
empty).
179. See Neill, 896 P.2d at 545 (reporting that Neill and Johnson arrived at the
Lawton Airport at approximately 2:30 p.m., and paid $1,200 in cash for tickets to San
Francisco).
180. See Neill, 263 F.3d at 1188 (explaining that when the two landed in San
Francisco, they spent some of the $17,000 they stole from the bank on expensive
jewelry, clothing, hotels, limousines, and cocaine).
181. See id. (commenting that much of the stolen money was marked, which
allowed authorities to trace the serial numbers to ascertain their location).
182. See id. at 1189 (noting that prior to his second trial, “Neill gave a video taped
interview to a religious television program, ‘The 700 Club,’ and wrote several letters
to an author writing a book about the murders. Neill also wrote letters and made
telephone calls apologizing to several victims. In these communications, Neill
admitted committing the crimes.”).
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result of his fear of losing his relationship with Johnson.”
In the
closing arguments of the sentencing phase, the prosecutor imported
Neill’s homosexuality as legal issue by explicitly asking the jurors to
consider it in their decision making just as they might consider other
184
statutorily prescribed factors. The prosecutor stated the following:
If I could ask each of you to disregard Jay Neill and take him out of
the person but consider things in a generic way. I want you to
think briefly about the man you’re setting [sic] in judgment
on . . . . I’d like to go through some things that to me depict the
true person, what kind of person he is. He is a homosexual. The
person you’re sitting in judgment on—disregard Jay Neill. You’re
deciding life or death on a person that’s a vowed [sic]
homosexual . . . . But these are areas you consider whenever you
determine the type of person you’re setting [sic] in judgment
on . . . . The individual’s homosexual. He’s in love with Robert
185
Grady Johnson.

The jury convicted Neill of four counts of murder in the first
degree, three counts of shooting with intent to kill, and one count of
186
The jury found the
attempted shooting with intent to kill.
existence of three aggravating factors and recommended the death
187
The trial court, following the
penalty for each count of murder.
188
jury’s recommendation, sentenced Neill to death.
In direct appeals in Oklahoma state court, Neill never raised the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor’s
183. Id. at 1197.
184. See id. In Oklahoma, jurors are allowed by statute to consider both mitigating
and aggravating circumstances in the sentencing phase of capital trials. See 21 OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 701.10(c) (2001) (allowing evidence to be presented in the sentencing
phase as to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in section
701.7); 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 601.11 (2001) (providing that if the verdict is a
unanimous recommendation of death, the jury must designate in writing the
statutory circumstances it unanimously determined beyond a reasonable doubt); see
generally 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 572 (2001) (remarking that it is appropriate for the
prosecutor to refer to the defendant’s remorse, or lack thereof, and to appeal to the
jury to assess the deterrent value of the death penalty).
185. See Neill, 263 F.3d at 1199 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting the prosecutor’s
remarks, and concluding that “[a]ccording to the prosecutor, the ‘true person,’ the
‘kind of person’ Neill is can be summed up in four words: ‘He is a homosexual.’”).
186. See Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537, 543 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (summarizing
the jury verdict).
187. See id. at 557-58 (listing the aggravating factors: (1) Neill had created a great
risk of death to more than one person; (2) he had committed the murders to avoid
arrest and prosecution; and (3) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel).
188. See id. at 543 n.1 (citing Neill v. State, 827 P.2d 884 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992))
(revealing that Neill and Johnson were initially tried together, however, those
sentences were vacated on appeal as a result of improper joinder). In a separate
retrial, Robert Johnson was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. See id.
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189

homophobic statements.
After obtaining new legal counsel, he
190
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and, among other
191
things, asserted that the prosecutor’s comments were inflammatory.
With little explanation and without even quoting the prosecutor’s
192
statement, two judges of the three-judge panel found that the
prosecutor’s comments about Neill’s homosexuality “were accurate,
in light of the evidence, and were relevant to both the State’s case
193
and Neill’s defense theory.”
Neill then successfully petitioned for a rehearing before the Tenth
194
In reevaluating Neill’s claims, the Tenth Circuit
Circuit panel.
focused on the merits of what it referred to as “underlying” claims of
195
prosecutorial misconduct.
In reevaluating the prosecutor’s
statements, the court’s standard of review required the remarks to
196
After reciting the
result in a “fundamentally unfair proceeding.”
197
prosecutor’s remarks, the court concluded that while they may have
189. See Neill, 943 P.2d at 147-48 (documenting Neill’s argument that he did not
waive his claim of prosecutorial misconduct); see also Neill, 263 F.3d at 1195
(explaining that “[b]ecause Neill did not assert any prosecutorial misconduct until
his state post-conviction application, the Oklahoma appellate court deemed him to
have waived these claims. That procedural bar is adequate to preclude federal
habeas review.”) (citations omitted).
190. Neill’s petition for habeas review was first denied by the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma. See Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL
1584819, at *1 (stating in the caption that the appeal is from the District Court, D.C.
No. Civ-97-1318-C). The District Court decision was not reported and it is never
mentioned by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
191. See Neill, 263 F.3d at 1197 (discussing the court’s refusal to address the claims
of prosecutorial misconduct on the merits because his failure to raise these claims on
direct appeal is procedural default barring habeas review). The court, however, did
evaluate the statements by the prosecutor concerning Neill’s homosexuality in the
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id. (noting that claim was
not procedurally barred).
192. See id. (stating that the prosecutor’s statement merely challenged Neill’s
proffered mitigating factor: that “[h]e had a gay lover he didn’t want to lose;” and
observing that the prosecutor then compared Neill’s situation to the breakup of a
heterosexual relationship). But see id. at 1202 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (responding to
the logic of the majority and stating, “[t]o my mind, that argument is no different
from claiming that a Jewish Defendant opens the door to a prosecutor’s anti-Semitic
arguments by wearing a yarmulke in the presence of jurors.”).
193. Id.
194. See Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 7,
2001) (filing the opinion on rehearing with the order granting Neill’s petition for
rehearing).
195. See id. at *8-9 (noting that because Neill had the same attorney at trial and on
direct appeal, his failure to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal is not a sufficient procedural bar to federal habeas review); see also supra note
191 and accompanying text (discussing same).
196. See id. at *9 (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 645 (1974)).
Part III of this Comment critiques the use of this Donnelly standard for reviewing
homosexual criminal defendants’ claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
197. See id. at *10-11 (quoting the prosecutor). But see supra note 192 (revealing
that in its first opinion the Tenth Circuit dismissed the prosecutor’s comments
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198

been “improper,” the remarks did not amount to a federal
199
constitutional deprivation. In deciding that the challenged remarks
200
could not “plausibly” have tipped the scales in favor of the
201
and
prosecution, the court put the comments in “context”
202
considered the strength of the state’s case against Neill. The court
203
then recited State’s evidence, which was largely uncontested at trial.
Ultimately, the court held that “in light of the overwhelming
evidence supporting Neill’s guilt and the charged aggravating
factors . . . we cannot say that the prosecutor’s improper comments
influenced the jury’s verdict or otherwise rendered the capital
204
sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair.”
Jay Wesley Neill
205
awaits his execution on death row in the State of Oklahoma.
B. Positive Bias: Prosecutors Making Assumptions About Homosexuality
that Cause them to Describe Homosexual Criminal Defendants Inaccurately
1.

206

The case of Wanda Jean Allen
Wanda Jean Allen and Gloria Leathers were involved in a

without quoting them because they were viewed as responsive to Neill’s proffered
mitigating circumstance—that he was under emotional duress for fear of losing his
lover).
198. See id. at *11 (conceding that “[t]here does not appear to be any legitimate
justification for these remarks.”).
199. See Neill, 2001 WL 1584819, at *11 (holding that “‘not every improper or
unfair remark made by a prosecutor will amount to a federal constitutional
deprivation.’”) (citations omitted).
200. The court actually considered the “probable effect the prosecutor’s remarks
had on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.” See id. (citing Rojem v. Gibson,
245 F.3d 1130, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added). Part III of this Comment
critiques this “outcome determinative” review of improper prosecutorial remarks.
201. See id. at *12 (stating that “the court considers the prosecutor’s remark ‘in
context, considering the strength of the State’s case and determining whether the
prosecutor’s challenged remarks plausibly could have tipped the scales in favor of
the prosecution.’” (quoting Rojem, 245 F.3d at 1142-43 and citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at
643)). Part III of this Comment critiques the casting of isolated prosecutorial
remarks that occur in the sentencing phase in the context of the entire trial.
202. See Neill, 2001 WL 1584819, at *11 (reciting the State’s evidence of the crimes
committed and the aggravating and mitigating factors presented to the jury).
203. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (noting that Neill did not contest
evidence of his guilt at his second trial).
204. See Neill, 2001 WL 1584819, at *12 (citing Rojem, 245 F.3d at 1142-43). The
court then found that Neill’s counsel was not objectively unreasonable for not raising
the prosecutorial claim on direct appeal. See id. (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.
259, 285 (2000)).
205. With the exception of Judge Lucero, who dissented in this case, every judge
on the Tenth Circuit voted to deny Neill’s petition for a rehearing en banc. See id. at
*1 (noting same). Jay Wesley Neill’s fate now lies in the hands of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
206. Allen v. Massie, No. 98-6340, 2000 WL 16321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1032 (2000); Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 952
(1994).
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homosexual relationship and had cohabited for approximately two
207
208
years.
Throughout their relationship, the two fought often. On
the day of the murder they had been fighting over a welfare check at
209
a local grocery store. The two women returned to their residence
and Leathers asked police to be present while Leathers removed
210
some of her personal property.
One of the three officers on the
scene noticed a small hand rake among the items packed into
Leather’s car, and placed the rake in a clothesbasket behind the
211
passenger seat for fear it might be used as a weapon.
The police
212
officers left the residence after they received a priority call.
Eventually, Leathers left the residence with her mother and the two
213
of them went to the police station to file a complaint against Allen.
Allen followed them to the police station and pleaded with Leathers
214
to continue the relationship and to return home.
During this
215
216
altercation, Allen shot Leathers and then fled in her car.
Leathers later died.
217
At trial, the jury found Allen guilty of first-degree murder.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found two
aggravating circumstances: (1) that Allen had a prior violent felony
207. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 86 (reciting the facts of the case); see also Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9, Allen v. Massie, No. CIV-96-0796-L (W.D. Okla. 1999)
[hereinafter Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus] (same).
208. See Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 207, at 9 (noting that
according to trial testimony, there was evidence that the two women had previously
engaged in fist fights during their arguments).
209. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 86; see also Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note
207, at 9 (citing the trial transcript at 83, 91-92).
210. See id. See also Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 207, at 10
(referring to trial transcript at 125-26 and noting that the dispute continued while
Leathers removed her property).
211. See Allen, 2000 WL 16321, at *1; see also Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus,
supra note 207, at 10-11 (citing the trial transcript at 131-33, 174-75).
212. See Allen, 2000 WL 16321, at *1 (noting that Allen later told police and
testified at trial that after the officers left the scene, Leathers assaulted her with the
hand rake); see also Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 207, at 13-14
(discussing that the wounds resulting from the hand rake assault were still visible
when police interrogated her days after the shooting and when she was
photographed at the Oklahoma County Jail).
213. See Allen, 2000 WL 16321, at *2 (noting that Leathers and her mother filed a
complaint against Allen “regarding the disputed property”); see also Allen Petition for
Habeas Corpus, supra note 207, at 11 (citing the trial transcript at 199).
214. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 86; see also Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note
207, at 11 (citing the trial transcript at 201-02).
215. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 86; see also Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note
207, at 13 (describing Allen’s testimony at trial that during the verbal confrontation
at the police station, Leathers approached her with the hand rake as if to hit her
again, and only then did she shoot Leathers).
216. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 86; see also Allen Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note
207, at 11-12 (noting that the police officers witnessed Allen’s vehicle speeding
away).
217. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 86.
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conviction; and (2) that she represented a continuing threat to
218
society.
The jury recommended that the death penalty be
219
imposed. The trial court followed the recommendation of the jury
220
and sentenced Allen to death.
On a direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma,
221
Allen raised several propositions of error. One of the alleged errors
was that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Allen was the
222
This evidence was apparently
“man” in the lesbian relationship.
“used to show that [Allen] was the aggressive person in the
223
relationship, while [Leathers] was more passive.” The appeals court
reasoned that the evidence would “help the jury understand why each
party acted the way she did both during events leading up to the
224
shooting and the shooting itself.” The court concluded that given
the circumstances of the crime, the probative value of the character

218. See id. at 104 (reporting the jury’s finding of both aggravating circumstances).
219. See id. at 86.
220. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 86.
221. See id. at 86-103 (examining Allen’s twenty-five propositions of error).
222. See id. at 95 (noting that this evidence was introduced as lay opinion
testimony from Leathers’ mother). The prosecuting attorney’s motive to create an
image of women charged with capital crimes as “evil” and “unladylike” has received a
great deal of attention from legal scholars. See Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill:
Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 1345, 1347
(1994) (arguing that the law governing the decision to impose the death penalty is a
“hidden battleground of gender”); Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender
and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501, 506, 565 (1990) (stating that
gender bias “infects” the administration of the death penalty); Victor L. Streib, Death
Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 878 (1990) (studying the
imposition of the death penalty upon female murderers throughout American
history, and indicating that although female offenders have generally benefited from
a gender-bias away from imposing the death penalty, most of the female offenders
who have been executed have “committed shockingly ‘unladylike’ behavior, allowing
the sentencing judges and juries to put aside any image of them as the ‘gentler sex’
and to treat them as ‘crazed monsters’ deserving nothing more than
extermination”); Victor L. Streib & Lynn Sametz, Executing Female Juveniles, 22 CONN.
L. REV. 3, 56-59 (1989) (attributing the extremely low number of female juveniles on
death row to the “strong, constitutionally based rejection of the death penalty for
juveniles and the even stronger, culturally based rejection of the death penalty for
females”); Jenny E. Carroll, Note, Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female
Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1413, 1452 (1997) (concluding that, in part, the decision to
impose the death penalty on female offenders depends upon the offenders’ “ability
to fall within the designated protective sphere of womanhood”).
223. Allen, 871 P.2d at 95. According to Allen’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, Allen’s trial attorney’s attempts to show the violent nature of Leathers
character were rebuffed at the prosecutor’s insistence. See Allen Petition for Habeas
Corpus, supra note 207, at 17, 59 (noting that police reports held by the prosecution
reflected that Leathers had been arrested more than a dozen times, including two
arrests for assault with a deadly weapon and two arrests for assault and battery).
224. See Allen, 871 P.2d at 95 (contemplating the probative value of Leathers’
mother’s testimony).
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evidence “was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”
Allen also argued that “the prosecutor improperly criticized her
during closing argument, making references to her status as the
226
dominant person in the homosexual relationship.”
In denying
Allen’s claim, the court reasoned the homosexual relationship was
“critical to the jury’s understanding of the facts surrounding the
227
shooting, and was a proper factor for the jury to consider.”
Allen then petitioned for habeas corpus relief in the Western
228
District of Oklahoma.
Allen’s petition was denied and she
229
subsequently appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Tenth Circuit ruled on seven independent instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, including instances where the prosecutor engaged in
230
biased behavior. The court reviewed the prosecutor’s comments in
context, looking at the strength of the evidence against Allen, and
decided whether the prosecutor’s statements “plausibly could have
231
tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution.” Ultimately, the court
considered the “probable effect the prosecutor’s [statements] would
have on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly” and concluded
232
that the trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair.
The court
explained that even if the comments were improper, they were not
233
significant enough to influence the jury’s decision. On January 11,
2001, at 9:21 p.m., Wanda Jean Allen, age forty-one, was executed by
234
lethal injection at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 97.
227. Id. (citing 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 695 (1983)) (allowing the jury to consider
the existence of a domestic relationship in determining the grade or punishment of
a homicide).
228. See Allen v. Massie, No. 98-6340, 2000 WL 16321, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 11,
2000) (reciting the procedural history of Allen’s case).
229. See id. at *12 (affirming the district court’s denial of Allen’s habeas corpus
petition).
230. See id. at *5 (listing the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct; those
relevant to the exhibition of biased conduct were: (2)(a) Ms. Leather’s mother’s
testimony in guilt stage opening argument [that Allen was the dominant person in
the relationship]; and (7) the prosecution’s improper name calling [that Allen was
the “man” in the relationship]).
231. See id. *6 (quoting Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also
supra Parts II.A.2, III & IV.C (discussing and critiquing this “outcome determinative”
approach).
232. See id. (quoting Kerby, 39 F.3d at 1474); see also supra Parts II.A.2, III & IV.C
(discussing the harm exacted on homosexual defendants by the probabilistic nature
of this standard of review).
233. See Allen v. Massie, No. 98-6340, 2000 WL 16321, at *6 (holding that “[i]n
light of the evidence of guilt and the weight of the aggravating circumstances, there
is not a reasonable probability that the outcomes at either stage would have been
different without the alleged misconduct.”) (citing Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239,
1244-45 (10th Cir. 1997)).
234. See Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2001, at A26 (noting that Wanda Jean
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C. Disrespectful References: Prosecutors Broadcasting their Bias Through
Words and Actions
1.

235

The case of Calvin Jerold Burdine
Calvin Burdine met W.T. “Dub” Wise in Houston, Texas, in
236
November of 1982. Subsequently, the two men became involved in
a homosexual relationship that continued for approximately three
237
Wise was
and a half months while Burdine lived with Wise.
employed as a night supervisor at a security guard service and
238
obtained a job for Burdine with the same company. Burdine and
Wise eventually began to quarrel about the manner in which Wise
239
handled Burdine’s earnings.
After Burdine refused to prostitute
240
himself for Wise, Wise asked Burdine to move out. Burdine moved
out and approximately two weeks later quit his job at the security
241
company. Then, in an effort to physically harm Burdine, Wise “put
242
a contract out on him.”
Burdine then met a seventeen-year-old gay man named Douglas
Allen is only the second black woman executed in this country since 1954); see also
Karen Klinka, Murder Case Stirs Attention Nationally, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 27, 2000,
at Cmty. II, Page 1 (interviewing police officers involved in the case, and noting that
the media company HBO plans to create a dramatization of the case).
235. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (vacating the
panel’s decision and reinstating the writ of habeas corpus). Burdine v. Johnson, 231
F.3d 950 (5th Cir. 2000) (reversing the District Court’s grant of writ of habeas
corpus). Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (granting
Burdine’s petition for writ of habeas corpus). Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (affirming Burdine’s conviction for capital murder), cert.
denied, Burdine v. Texas, 480 U.S. 940 (1987).
236. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 312; see also Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 20, Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (No. H-944190) [hereinafter Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus].
237. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 312.
238. See id. See also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 20
(pointing out that because of Burdine’s previous criminal history, Wise devised a
plan to conceal Burdine’s real identity by using the pseudonym “Michael Tomlinson”
in order to obtain employment at the security guard company).
239. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 312; see also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus,
supra note 236, at 20 (explaining that because Burdine could not cash paychecks
issued to his pseudonym “Thomlinson,” Wise picked up Burdine’s paychecks, had
Burdine sign them over to him, and deposited them into his own account).
240. Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); see
also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 21 (charging that Wise
had a practice of befriending young male homosexuals and recruiting them to work
for him as prostitutes).
241. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 312-13; see also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus,
supra note 236, at 21 (noting that before Burdine moved out, Wise physically
assaulted him).
242. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313; see also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus,
supra note 236, at 21 (maintaining that Burdine was told by a number of Wise’s
prostitutes that Wise “put a contract out on him” and that on one occasion four of
Wise’s hustlers physically assaulted Burdine, breaking his nose, at Wise’s behest).
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243

McCreight.
On April 18, 1983, Burdine and McCreight went to
244
Wise’s home to get money from him. After Burdine and McCreight
talked with Wise for approximately thirty minutes, McCreight asked
245
to go to the bathroom. When McCreight returned he was wearing a
246
pair of gloves and carrying Wise’s gun and a large hunting knife.
McCreight ordered Wise to lie on the floor, and he bound his
247
wrists. Burdine retrieved a pair of socks, which McCreight stuffed
248
in Wise’s mouth. Burdine and McCreight began stacking items by
249
the front door so that they could take them later.
Burdine and
McCreight decided that “something had to be done” with Wise
250
McCreight cut an electrical cord
because he could identify them.
251
of a clock radio and bound Wise’s legs.
Both Burdine and
252
McCreight unsuccessfully attempted to smother Wise with a pillow.
After further discussion, McCreight hit Wise over the head several
253
times with a lead-filled police sap. Burdine and McCreight left the
254
Concerned that Wise
home, taking the stolen items with them.
255
could identify them, they decided to return to the scene. Upon reentering the home, McCreight made the sign of the cross and
256
stabbed Wise in the back.
Burdine and McCreight fled to Austin, Texas, where Burdine
pawned a television set and obtained money from different automatic
257
The two men then
teller machines with Wise’s bankcard.
243. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313.
244. See id. See also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 22-23
(noting that Burdine warned McCreight that Wise kept a pistol in his bedroom).
245. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. See also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 24
(citing the trial transcript where Burdine testified that he continually asked
McCreight to stop attacking Wise).
249. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313; see also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus,
supra note 236, at 24 (quoting the trial transcripts showing that Burdine began taking
things from the trailer because he “knew [he] had to leave, and [he] was going to
need money”).
250. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313.
256. See id. (according to Burdine’s extra-judicial confession he also stabbed Wise
once, stating: “[w]hat the hell, hand me the knife.”); see also Burdine Petition for
Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 25-26 (noting that the circumstances surrounding
Wise’s stabbing were never resolved as Texas law allows a capital murder conviction
for both principals and accomplices).
257. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313; see also Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus,
supra note 236, at 26 (indicating that Burdine used Wise’s bank card to withdraw
funds from the account which Burdine’s own checks were deposited).
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proceeded from Austin to Eureka, California, where they pawned
258
259
Wise’s gun for thirty dollars.
Burdine and McCreight were
arrested at a local gas station. McCreight pleaded guilty to a lesser
260
charge and was paroled after only eight years in prison.
Burdine
was returned to Houston and indicted for capital murder on June 18,
261
1983. The trial, lasting twelve hours and fifty-one minutes, resulted
in Burdine’s conviction for “intentionally and knowingly” causing the
262
death of Wise.
263
During his trial and subsequent direct appeal,
Burdine
consistently endured homophobic and biased conduct not only from
the prosecuting attorney but also from his own court appointed
264
265
defense counsel. At trial, Burdine’s attorney, Joe Cannon, failed
to object to several homophobic comments by the prosecuting
266
The prosecutor made one of his most egregious
attorney.
comments during the punishment phase’s closing arguments when
he stated, “[s]ending a homosexual to the penitentiary certainly isn’t
a very bad punishment for a homosexual, and that’s what he’s asking
267
you to do.”
Cannon also failed to object to the prosecutor’s
reliance on Burdine’s 1971 consensual sodomy conviction used as
258. See Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 313.
259. McCreight pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and was paroled after only eight
years in prison. See Weinstein, infra note 265, at A10 (reporting the sentencing
disparity between Burdine and McCreight); Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854,
855 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (stating same).
260. See Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
261. See Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 27.
262. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 338; Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 312.
263. Burdine’s court-appointed attorney, Joe Canon, served as counsel
throughout both his trial and direct appeal. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 339 (stating
same).
264. See Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 106-12
(recounting numerous instances of Cannon’s own homophobia as illustrated by
comments made on the record or in affidavits submitted to the court).
265. See Henry Weinstein, Ruling on Sleeping Lawyer; Court: Texas Man Facing
Execution Will Get Another Trial Because His Lawyer Was Unconscious During the First One,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at A10 (revealing that during Cannon’s career as a defense
attorney, ten of his clients were sentenced to death); Paul M. Barrett, A Mockery of the
Process, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at A1 (noting that “[i]n Texas, which executes
more people than any other state, Mr. Cannon’s collection of ten death sentences is
one of the largest among active lawyers”); see also Burdine, 262 F.3d at 339 (agreeing
with the district court’s conclusion that several members of the jury and the deputy
court clerk witnessed Cannon sleeping as many as ten times and for as long as ten
minutes); Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (entering “a
finding that defense counsel dozed and actually fell asleep during portions of
[Burdine’s] trial on the merits, in particular the guilt-innocence phase when the
State’s solo prosecutor, was questioning witnesses and presenting evidence,” yet
nevertheless denying habeas relief).
266. See Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 115 (arguing
Cannon’s failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel).
267. See id. at 115-16 (quoting the trail transcript).
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evidence to support the claim that Burdine would be a future danger
268
to society. Finally, Cannon accepted three jurors who admitted in
voir dire that they possessed varying degrees of prejudice against
269
homosexuals.
Cannon himself frequently used derogatory terms to describe
homosexuals in various court proceedings, which perhaps explains
270
his failure to object to them during Burdine’s trial. During a 1988
evidentiary hearing in state court, Cannon variously referred to
271
homosexuals by using the terms “queer,” “fairy,” and “tush hog.” In
an affidavit submitted during the court proceedings, Cannon used
272
the term “queer” to describe gay men. In a 1995 state evidentiary
hearing, Cannon stated that he believed that “queer” and “fairy” were
merely commonly acceptable forms of “street language” used to
273
describe male homosexuals. When asked whether he had also used
the term “faggot” to describe homosexuals, he stated, “I don’t recall,
274
Finally, Cannon revealed that he referred to
I may have.”
homosexuals as people who have a medical or mental “problem
which they can’t help” and which “doctors and psychologists” cannot
275
seem to cure.
After several unsuccessful attempts for habeas relief in the Texas
268. See id. (quoting the trail transcript); see also Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1309
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that previous sexually deviant behavior without a showing of
violence is not probative of a defendant’s future dangerousness).
269. See Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 116-17. One juror
admitted that he “disagree[d] with the homosexual lifestyle and “[he] can’t really say
that [his view of homosexuals] would not bias [him] somewhat.” Id. Another juror
stated: “. . . I have always and I will continue to in the future, not have anything
socially to do with them [homosexuals]. The few close encounters I had, have been
situations of enragement . . . . [T]hat’s the way I feel.” Id. A third juror stated: “I
think they’re [homosexuals] not normal in the sense of the word . . . . To me, they
have a problem.” Id.
270. See Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 106-10 (detailing
the extent of Cannon’s use of homophobic slang terms to describe homosexual
people).
271. See id. at 106 (providing evidence that Cannon possesses homophobic views
which equate to prejudices against homosexuals based on their sexual preferences).
272. See id. at 106 (demonstrating that Cannon harbored ill feelings towards
homosexuals and had no problem going on the record with those feelings in both
written and oral form).
273. See id. at 110 (rejecting Cannon’s assertion that the terms “queer” and “fairy,”
which he used to describe homosexuals, are not akin to racial epithets such as
“nigger”); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS 6-13
(1999) (analogizing African Americans’ struggle for civil rights to the gay rights
movement).
274. See Burdine Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 236, at 110 (stating that
Cannon did not find the term offensive and that he was “never too concerned” about
using such terms in a variety of settings).
275. See id. at 110 (rejecting Cannon’s assumption and arguing that it flies in the
face of over thirty years of medical thought; the American Psychiatric Association has
stated since 1973 that homosexuality is not a medical or psychological pathology).
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court system, Burdine appealed to the U.S. District Court in
276
Houston.
There, Burdine raised ten issues in his application for
writ of habeas corpus, including whether the prosecutor’s
homophobic remarks to the jury violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
277
Amendment rights. United States District Judge Hittner, however,
never addressed this point of error in his decision to grant habeas
relief and based his finding on the fact that Burdine’s counsel
278
“slep[t] throughout substantial portions of his criminal trial.” The
State of Texas appealed Hittner’s decision to the Fifth Circuit Court
279
of Appeals, which vacated the decision and cleared the way for
280
Burdine’s execution.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit en banc, the
court affirmed the district court’s decision and vacated Burdine’s
281
conviction, leaving the State of Texas with three options: (1) appeal
276. See Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that
after denial of habeas corpus relief by the Texas courts in both June of 1994 and
April of 1995, Burdine’s writ of habeas corpus was granted by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas in September of 1999).
277. See id. at 856. The petition argued that in addition to the homophobic
remarks, petitioner should be granted habeas corpus relief because: (1) petitioner’s
trial counselor’s poor performance violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to “effective assistance of counsel;” (2) Texas forfeited its right to execute
petitioner under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) petitioner’s status as
the non-triggerman deserved a “constitutionally adequate vehicle” for jury
consideration; (4) equating the term “deliberate” to that of “intentional” violated the
petitioner’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) petitioner’s
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated due to the introduction of
allegedly highly incriminating evidence by a non-testifying co-defendant; (6) the jury
was not given the “adequate mitigating effect” of childhood sexual abuse and neglect
for consideration; (7) the prosecutor’s closing arguments violated petitioner’s Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (8) an evidentiary hearing should have been
conducted because there was a failure to resolve a factual dispute; and (9) an alleged
unconstitutional 1971 sodomy conviction could not be used by the state to prove that
the petitioner “posed a future threat to society.” Id.
278. See id. at 866-67 (granting the writ of habeas corpus, vacating Burdine’s
criminal conviction below, and ordering the state of Texas to either retry or release
him within 120 days).
279. See Deborah Tedford, Death Row Inmate Ordered Released; Prosecutors Missed
Deadline to Retry Him, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 2, 2000 (reporting that the State of Texas
missed the 120 day deadline to retry Burdine and that U.S. District Court Judge
Hittner ordered his release within five days; the State of Texas filed an emergency
request for a stay from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals); Bruce Nichols, Death Row
Inmate to Remain in Prison: Judge Had Ordered Convicted Killer Freed Because State Lawyers
Missed Deadline, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 4, 2000, at 31A (reporting that the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted the state’s stay and ordered Burdine to be held in
custody; quoting the order: “[b]ased upon our review of pertinent portions of the
record, including of the trial transcript, we conclude . . . that Burdine should not be
released pending appeal.”).
280. See Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 2000) (vacating the
decision of the district court because according to the court, the circumstances of
the case did not support presuming prejudice).
281. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(vacating the earlier decision of its own bench based upon a belief that Burdine’s
counsel sleeping through a critical stage of the trial is equivalent to a denial of
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to the U.S. Supreme Court; (2) retry Burdine; or (3) set him free.
Calvin Jerold Burdine, age forty-six, awaits the state’s decision from
death row.
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
INADEQUATELY PROTECTS HOMOSEXUAL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so
grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
282
action.

Contrary to the proclamation above, it appears that in numerous
283
cases, the death penalty, as opposed to a life sentence, is applied to
homosexual criminal defendants, at least in part, because of their
284
sexual orientation. The sample of cases in Part II demonstrates that
285
prosecuting attorneys, acting as advocates of the state, make
calculated decisions about when and how to introduce evidence of
286
Their goal, this Comment
the defendant’s sexual orientation.
287
asserts, is to appeal to the prejudices of the jury, and ultimately to
288
solidify the chances of securing a death sentence. This Part argues
counsel, a violation of Burdine’s Sixth Amendment right).
282. Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (holding that although the death
penalty itself is not unconstitutional, the statutes that regulate its implementation
must specify the aggravating factors and mitigating factors that juries may utilize); see
also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (concluding that a jury must have the
opportunity to consider not only why a death penalty should be imposed, but also
why it should not be imposed.”); Profflitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding
that sentencing a defendant to life in prison or death depended upon whether
“certain statutory aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime outweighed any
statutory mitigating circumstances found to exist”).
283. See supra note 22 (speculating that prosecutorial misuse of and improper
argument about a criminal defendant’s sexual orientation is more widespread than
the sample of cases discussed in Part II, standing alone, might suggest).
284. See Part II (providing a narrative of four cases where the prosecuting
attorneys variously used the defendants’ sexual orientation to inflame the prejudices
of the jury, presumably to increase the likelihood of a death sentence).
285. See Michael T. Fisher, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process:
There’s More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1303 (1988)
(discussing the dual role of the prosecuting attorney).
286. See supra Part II (providing a narrative of four cases where the prosecutor
prejudicially introduced the defendant’s sexual orientation).
287. See Rovella, supra note 21 and accompanying text (revealing that in a national
poll of potential jurors, seventeen percent reported that they could not be fair to a
homosexual defendant, and that national opinion polls of the general public reveal
that animosity towards homosexuals, though declining, is still prevalent); see also
supra note 6 and accompanying text (indicating that according to national polling
data a significant number of Americans still believe that homosexual relationships
between consenting adults should be illegal).
288. See Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
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that the standards by which the prejudicial comments of the
289
prosecutor are reviewed on appeal leave homosexual criminal
defendants particularly unprotected.
Under this view, these
defendants, then, are potentially being sent to their deaths not only
because of the crimes of which they have been convicted, but also
because of their status as homosexuals.
The U.S. Supreme Court established the standard of review for
prosecutorial misconduct in the form of improper remarks in
290
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo.
According to Donnelly, in order for
291
prejudicial prosecutorial remarks to constitute reversible error, the
remarks must be viewed in the “context of the entire trial” and must
be “sufficiently prejudicial” so as to deny the defendant the due
292
The Court revisited the issue of the prosecutor’s
process of law.
471, 483 (1999) (revealing that according to the results of a controlled study,
“improper statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument influence
participant-jurors’ sentencing recommendations;” and that “[p]articipant-jurors who
were exposed to improper statements made by the prosecutor were significantly
more likely to recommend the death penalty than those jurors not exposed.”).
289. The standard of review that appellate courts actually employ in reviewing
these claims can vary widely from case to case depending on a number of factors,
including but not limited to: the extent and nature of the misconduct; whether it was
contemporaneously objected to; whether the misconduct deprived the defendant of
a constitutional right; and whether the judge gave a curative instruction to the jury.
See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT § 6 (1997)
(providing an overview of the various factors that require different standards of
review by appellate courts; and collecting sample cases). The type of the misconduct,
whether the trial was in federal or state court, the particular kind of appeal, and the
particular kind of relief the petitioner is asking the reviewing court for all affect the
standards that reviewing courts apply. See GERSHMAN, § 6-3 to 6-5 (describing plain
error review, harmless error review for both constitutional and non-constitutional
errors, habeas corpus review, special harmless error rules, and supervisory review;
and collecting sample cases); see also Brian C. Duffy, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument
for a Per Se Reversible-Error Rule for Prosecutors’ Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing
Phase of Capital Cases, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1339-49 (1997) (discussing the “current”
standards for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct and concluding that results of
different standards under direct appeal and habeas review yield similar results);
Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A Proposal for Handling Prosecutorial Appeals
to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice During Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 319, 321-24
(2001) (discussing the “usual” standards of review for evaluating charges of
prosecutorial misconduct). The standard of review as discussed in this section serves
as a general discussion of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that the Lingar, Allen, and
Neill courts used in dismissing the respective claims of prosecutorial misconduct. An
in-depth analysis of the various standards is beyond the scope of this Part.
290. 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (considering whether remarks made by the prosecutor,
although admittedly improper, constituted enough prejudice to deprive the
petitioner of a constitutionally guaranteed free trial).
291. See id. at 642-43 (distinguishing the prosecutor’s remarks in this case from
ones that prejudice a specific right such as the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination or the right to counsel; and noting that under such circumstances, the
Court has taken “special care” to insure that prosecutorial misconduct does not
infringe upon them).
292. See id. at 645 (discussing situations where the improper actions of opposing
counsel might deprive defendants of specific benefits provided by the Bill of Rights,
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improper comments in criminal trials in Darden v. Wainwright.
In
Darden, the Court reaffirmed Donnelly, continuing to require the
prosecutor’s comments to reach the threshold of “so infect[ing] the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
294
due process” before rising to the level of reversible error.
This standard of review inadequately protects homosexual criminal
defendants because they often endure biased behavior from not only
the prosecuting attorney, but also, as the studies discussed in Part I
indicate, from the court system itself, as further illustrated in the
295
cases discussed in Part II. The Donnelly/Darden standard, operating
in an already biased system, requires homosexual criminal
defendants to prove the nearly impossible: that their sentencing
hearing was rendered “fundamentally unfair” on the basis of an
isolated question or comment about their sexual orientation by the
296
prosecuting attorney.
Similarly, the Donnelly/Darden standard’s
reliance on the “context of the entire trial” acts to further dilute the
potency of isolated homophobic comments such as the ones in
and concluding that this was not the case in the present action).
293. 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (affirming the rulings of the lower courts that certain
opinionated comments during closing arguments concerning the strength of the
prosecution’s case, although improper, did not deprive the petitioner of a fair trial).
294. See id. at 181 (finding that in light of the totality of the evidence against the
accused, improper comments were not likely prejudicial enough to influence the
jury, therefore, regardless of the fact that the trial was “not perfect” it was not
“fundamentally unfair”). In reaching this conclusion, the Darden Court found the
following factors instructive:
(1) whether the weight of evidence going to guilt was heavy, (2) whether the
state manipulated or misstated evidence, (3) whether the state’s remarks
were invited by or responsive to the defense, (4) whether the trial court
issued a curative jury instruction, and (5) whether defense counsel was able
to cast the state’s comments and actions “in a light that was more likely to
engender strong disapproval than result in inflamed passions against
petitioner.”
See Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *20 (Lucero, J., dissenting)
(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182-83 (1986)).
295. See supra Part I (discussing two state-wide studies on the prevalence of sexual
orientation bias in the courts; and revealing that homophobic conduct by judicial
actors is endemic). The existence of general societal animosity against homosexuals
leads Judge Lucero, dissenting in Neill, to conclude that “[t]he openly gay defendant
thus finds himself at a disadvantage from the outset of his prosecution.” See Neill v.
Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *18 (citing polling data and literature that
suggests despite gains in societal acceptance, animosity against gays and lesbians
remains high).
296. See supra Part II.A.1 (indicating that in the case of Lingar, the prosecutor only
asked Smith three questions about the nature of his and Lingar’s relationship); see
supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the remarks by the prosecutor in Neill’s case came
only at the closing argument of the sentencing phase of trial); see supra Part II.B
(revealing that the prosecutor in Allen’s case only made two references to her as “the
man of the relationship”); see supra Part II.C (describing the prosecutor’s remarks
about sending Burdine to prison for life as “hardly a punishment” came only in the
closing argument in the sentencing phase of the trial).
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297

Lingar, Neill, Allen, and Burdine.
Applying the “contextual” requirement of the Donnelly/Darden
standard, in cases where the misconduct happens in sentencing
298
hearings, also presents fundamental flaws.
As opposed to the
guilt/innocence phase, where the jury is charged with determining
299
specific questions of fact, the jury considers a wider array of factors.
The “contextual” analysis, then, allows a specific determination of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial to compensate for isolated
comments by the prosecutor at sentencing. Courts that review claims
of prosecutorial misconduct by applying the Donnelly/Darden
standard, which weighs evidence of the defendant’s guilt from trial
and then evaluates the prosecutor’s isolated comments in the
sentencing hearing in the context of the entire trial, inevitably reach
the conclusion that the defendant was not denied due process. The
Donnelly/Darden standard, and the courts that use it, offers little help
to homosexual criminal defendants who may have been convicted at
300
trial on overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Furthermore, the Donnelly/Darden standard, as applied by the
Tenth Circuit, which decided the fate of Jay Wesley Neill and Wanda
Jean Allen, conflates what should properly be a question of plausible
301
prejudice with that of probable prejudice.
The Tenth Circuit has
explained that in viewing the prosecutor’s remarks in context, “we
look first at the strength of the evidence against the defendant and
decide whether the prosecutor’s statements plausibly ‘could have
302
Ultimately,
tipped the scales in the favor of the prosecution.’”
297. See supra Part II (providing a narrative of each death penalty case and
indicating that the prosecutor’s comments were isolated occurrences in the context
of the entire trials).
298. See Niell v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at 21 (Lucero, J.,
dissenting) (finding the majority’s application of Donnelly/Darden deficient because
“it ignores the qualitative difference between the guilt-innocence and capitalsentencing stages of trial, a distinction acknowledged in Darden itself.”).
299. See Duffy, supra note 289, at 1378 (arguing that the sentencing jury plays a
different role than the trial jury, and further arguing that jurors are often confused
about the rules of the capital sentencing guidelines and their role in the process).
300. See Jon A. Hlafter, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 89 GEO. L.J. 1579, 1579, n.1739
(2001) (listing cases from each of the federal circuit courts that illustrate instances
where the prosecutorial comments or arguments were held harmless error where the
evidence of the convicted person’s guilt was overwhelming).
301. See Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *21 (10th Cir. Dec. 7,
2001) (Lucero, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s probabilistic analysis of
whether the prosecutor’s comments tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution,
and arguing that the correct analysis is whether they plausibly could have).
302. Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994) (Lucero, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the three challenged remarks by the prosecutor, although
improper, did not “den[y] Fero of a fair trial or infringe his right to due process.”
(quoting Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1210 (10th Cir. 1989))) (emphasis
added).
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however, the Tenth Circuit, “consider[s] the probable effect the
prosecutor’s [statements] would have on the jury’s ability to judge
303
the evidence fairly.”
The Donnelly/Darden standard, as applied by the Tenth Circuit,
therefore, establishes an outcome-determinative test that actually
evaluates the evidence of the convicted person’s guilt, while
determining whether the prosecutor’s comments constitute
304
reversible error.
This outcome-determinative approach has
substantially “stacked the cards” against homosexual criminal
defendants who may indeed be guilty of their crimes, but who have
also suffered from prosecutors using the defendant’s sexual
305
orientation in ways that might evoke prejudice from the jury.
Arguably, in practice, the Tenth Circuit’s approach means that
homosexual defendants who are found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial will not be guaranteed a sentencing proceeding that is
free from often blatant prejudice based on their sexual orientation.
IV. A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S SEXUAL ORIENTATION SHOULD NEVER
BE A FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE THE DEATH
PENALTY
It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted
on one defendant is “unusual” if it discriminates against him by
reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it
is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
306
prejudices . . . .
303. See Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *19 (10th Cir. Dec. 7,
2001) (quoting Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also supra
notes 232-33 and accompanying text (revealing that the Tenth Circuit used the same
analysis to determine that Wanda Jean Allen’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct did
not constitute reversible error).
304. See Fisher, supra note 285, at 1298 (arguing that outcome determinative
analysis is inappropriate in determinging potential due process violations).
305. See supra notes 6, 21 (revealing that a significant number of jurors admit that
they could not be fair to homosexual defendants); see also Platania & Moran, supra
note 288 (reporting that according to a recent study of potential jurors, a significant
number are more likely to impose a death sentence in trials where there is
prosecutorial misconduct present).
306. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Sexual orientation is noticeably absent from this list of classifications deserving
protection. Courts have only recently begun to hold that sexual orientation is a
classification also worthy of any level of protection. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
635 (1996) (holding the State of Colorado’s Amendment 2 is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, as “it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake”);
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding a police
officer’s threat to disclose an arrested minor’s homosexuality violated his
constitutional right to privacy); E. High Sch. Prism Club v. Seidel, 95 F. Supp. 2d
1239, 1251 (D. Utah 2000) (granting the plaintiff school club’s motion for injunctive
relief because the student club established a “substantial likelihood that [they would]
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Questions about the fairness of the current application of the
307
death penalty have led two justices on the U.S. Supreme Court to
eventually succeed on the merits” of their First Amendment claim); Ray v. Antioch
Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that
harassment due to the victim’s perceived homosexuality can constitute “sexual
harassment” within the meaning of Title IX); E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of
Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1197-98 (D. Utah 1999)
(holding that denying the student club the same opportunities to meet as other noncurricular clubs violated their rights under the Equal Access Act); Weaver v. Nebo
Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279. 1285, 1289-90 (D. Utah 1998) (finding that the
school district violated a teacher’s First Amendment and rights under the Equal
Protection Clause when they placed restrictions on her right to speak in public about
her sexuality).
307. Since 1976, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its landmark ruling
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976), that capital punishment is not per se
unconstitutional, the Court has continuously grappled with various constitutional
fairness issues associated with the death penalty. See, e.g., Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (finding mandatory death sentences for certain crimes
impermissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because of their
failure to allow for jury discretion or particularized review of the defendant before
sentencing him to death); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-93 (1977) (declaring
the death penalty a disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment for
the crime of rape and recognizing the difficulty in supporting a claim that “the death
penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the state’s criminal justice system.”);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (prohibiting states from limiting the jury’s
ability to consider mitigating factors in death penalty cases); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 797-98 (1982) (ruling that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition
of the death penalty on those who only aid and abet a felony); Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 894 (1983) (deciding that federal courts may use special “speeded-up”
procedures for handling habeas corpus appeals in death penalty cases); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-18 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of those who are, or who have gone, insane while awaiting
execution); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (upholding the
constitutionality of the death penalty by finding that despite studies that showed that
black people who murder white people are generally more likely to receive a death
sentence, it in and of itself does not show particular jurors or prosecutors in cases
were racially motivated); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (striking down a
statute that imposed mandatory death sentences on prisoners who were convicted of
murder while serving life sentences for failing to adequately consider the significance
of individualized sentencing); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988)
(holding that the execution of persons who were fifteen years old or younger at the
commission of their crimes is not permissible under the Eighth Amendment because
the imposition of the death penalty at such an age fails to contribute to the intended
goals of capital punishment); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-35 (1984)
(allowing the imposition of the death penalty for people convicted of murder, even
though they are mildly mentally retarded); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 36973 (1989) (discerning that no societal consensus for forbidding the imposition of the
death penalty in the case at had, and, as a result, ruling that the Eighth Amendment
allows the imposition of the death penalty on convicted murderers who were sixteen
years of age or older at the time they committed their crimes); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497
U.S. 764, 780-83 (1990) (allowing federal appellate court to determine “whether any
rational trier of fact could have found” the elements of an aggravating circumstance
in the consideration of a death penalty case); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49
(1990) (upholding a state law that allowed judges, rather than juries, to decide
whether to impose the death penalty on those convicted of first-degree murder).
Over this nearly thirty-year period, public support for the death penalty has also
substantially declined. See Brooke A. Masters, Executions Decrease For the 2nd Year; Va.,
Texas Show Sharp Drops Amid a National Trend, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2001, at A01
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comment publicly about their skepticism of the system.
Justices
Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg have both publicly
309
stated that they believe the current system should be scrutinized.
Although this new discourse on the death penalty is primarily focused
on the defendant’s representation at trial and the prosecution of
310
potentially innocent people,
the discrimination inflicted by
prosecutors on homosexual criminal defendants such as Lingar,
Neill, Allen, and Burdine should also be included in the discussion.
This Part points out that federal appellate courts have not been
receptive to criminal defendants’ claims that remarks by the
prosecutors about their sexual orientation rendered their sentencing
hearings unfair. Indeed, in Lingar, Neill, Allen, and Burdine, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth, Tenth, and Fifth
Circuits respectively, demonstrated an unwillingness to find
homophobic and discriminatory behavior exhibited by the
311
prosecution to constitute reversible error.
This Comment argues
(reporting that the public support for the death penalty, sixty three percent, is at its
lowest point in twenty years); Thomas Healy, Death Penalty Support Drops as Debate
Shifts; Foes Turning Focus from Moral Issues to Flaws in the System, BALT. SUN, July 25,
2001, at 1A (revealing that “two-thirds of Americans support a moratorium on
executions until questions about the fairness and integrity of the way the death
penalty is administered can be resolved.”). This falling public support has not gone
unnoticed by elected officials. See Healy, supra, at 8A (explaining that Illinois
Governor George Ryan’s moratorium was motivated in part because thirteen death
row inmates have been exonerated since 1977; that a proposed moratorium in
Maryland stalled in the senate; that bills to temporarily halt executions in New
Hampshire and Nebraska were vetoed by their governors; and pointing out that
seventeen states, including Arizona, Connecticut, Florida and Missouri, have banned
the execution of mildly retarded people; and that “many” of the thirty-eight states
with the death penalty are considering or have approved legislation to afford greater
protections for those accused of capital crimes). The U.S. Congress is also taking
notice and is considering legislation that would require states to provide qualified
and experienced attorneys to all defendants facing the death penalty and that would
provide improved access to DNA testing. See Innocence Protection Act, H.R. 912,
107th Cong. (2001); S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001).
308. See Yochi J. Dreazen, O’Connor’s Remarks On Death Penalty Could Bolster Bills,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A7 (quoting Justice O’Connor); Justice Supports Md.
Moratorium on Death Penalty, ARIZ. REPUB., Apr. 10, 2001, at A6 (quoting Justice
Ginsburg).
309. See Dreazen, supra note 308 (quoting Justice O’Connor who told a group of
female lawyers in Minnesota that “the system may well be allowing some innocent
defendants to be executed”); see also ARIZ. REPUB., supra note 308 (quoting Justice
Ginsburg who said, “I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the
Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was well
represented at trial . . . . People who are well represented at trial do not get the
death penalty.”).
310. See ARIZ. REPUB., supra note 308 (indicating that Justices O’Connor and
Ginsburg are concerned about innocent individuals being put to death and
ineffective assistance of counsel respectively); see also Healy, supra note 307.
311. See Lingar, 176 F.3d 453, 458 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that the prosecutor’s
tactics did not render his trial fundamentally unfair). The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals similarly dismissed Allen’s claim. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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that the sexual orientation of a criminal defendant should never be a
factor in the jury’s determination in a sentencing hearing of whether
312
to impose the death penalty. It also makes two recommendations:
(1) that the prosecutor’s introduction of unrelated evidence of a
313
criminal defendant’s homosexual status in the sentencing phase of
314
a capital trial should constitute reversible error; and (2) that a
prosecutor’s prejudicial and inflammatory statements about a
criminal defendant’s homosexual status in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial should constitute reversible error. Part IV concludes with
a discussion of Judge Luecero’s scathing dissent in Neill, which
provides hope for similarly situated defendants that federal appellate
courts are beginning to recognize this form of prosecutorial
misconduct.
A. The Prosecutor’s Introduction of Unrelated Evidence of a Criminal
Defendant’s Homosexual Status in the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial
Should Constitute Reversible Error
315

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Dawson v. Delaware that
introduction of evidence of the defendant’s membership in the
Aryan Brotherhood at sentencing was irrelevant and constitutionally
316
impermissible.
This Comment argues that under Dawson,
A two-judge majority of that Circuit followed the same reasoning in Neill. See supra
note 199 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals never
addressed the issue of the prosecutor’s comments, instead it focused exclusively on
the question of whether Burdine was deprived of his right to effective assistance of
counsel by the fact that his lawyer slept through portions of his trial. See supra note
277 and accompanying text.
312. The term “factor” is used to connote instances of normative bias by the
prosecutors, as in the cases of Lingar and Neill, where the jury is urged to actually
consider the sexual orientation of the defendant as it would legitimately consider
statutorily prescribed circumstances such as the heinousness of the crime, or that the
defendant poses a future threat to society; and instances of positive bias and
disrespectful references, as in the cases of Allen and Burdine (respectively), where the
comments and stereotypes proffered by the prosecutor actually urge the jury to base
their sentencing decision on prejudice against homosexuals.
313. See supra note 2 (distinguishing the term homosexual status from simply
homosexual conduct).
314. Reviewing courts, finding the prejudicial introduction of evidence of the
defendant’s sexual orientation or prejudicial comments about the defendant’s sexual
orientation, should vacate the death sentence and remand the case for a new
sentencing determination.
315. 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992) (stating “we conclude that Dawson’s First
Amendment beliefs were violated . . . because the evidence proved nothing more
than Dawson’s abstract beliefs.”).
316. See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 160; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)
(holding that the “factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant
to the sentencing process [include] . . . the race, religion, or political affiliation of
the defendant. . .”). But see O’Neal v. Delo, 44 F.3d 655, 661 (8th Cir. 1995)
(upholding a death sentence where evidence of the defendant’s membership in
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prejudicial prosecutorial comments about the sexual orientation of
defendants are impermissible. Furthermore, this Comment argues
that under Dawson the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s
homosexual status by prosecutors exhibiting normative bias (i.e.,
317
importing the sexual orientation of the defendant as a legal issue)
should constitute reversible error, and warrant a new sentencing
318
proceeding.
In Dawson, the defendant, David Dawson, was convicted of firstdegree murder, possession of a deadly weapon during the
commission of a felony, and various other crimes by a trial court in
319
the State of Delaware. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the
prosecution gave notice that it sought to introduce evidence of
Dawson’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacy
320
group. Pursuant to a stipulation agreement, Dawson allowed the
prosecutor to introduce a statement to the jury describing the Aryan
321
Brotherhood.
322
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the seven-member majority,
concluded that the evidence presented to the jury about Dawson’s
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was “totally without relevance
323
to Dawson’s sentencing proceeding.” Rehnquist reasoned that even
if the Delaware group to which Dawson allegedly belonged did
espouse racist beliefs, it was not relevant to Dawson’s case because
324
elements of racial hatred were not involved in the killing.
racist prison gang was relevant to show a racial motive for the murder).
317. See supra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing normative bias in the cases of Lingar and
Neill).
318. See Duffy, supra note 289, at 1382-85 (concluding that vacating the death
sentence and remanding for a new sentencing hearing not only negates the impact
of improper prosecutorial arguments, but it also ensures adequate deterrence).
319. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 161 (1992) (stating the facts of the
case).
320. See id. The evidence that the prosecution sought to admit as:
(1) expert testimony regarding the origin and nature of the Aryan
Brotherhood, as well as the fact that Dawson had the words ‘Aryan
Brotherhood’ tattooed on the back of his right hand, (2) testimony that
Dawson referred to himself as ‘Abaddon’ and had the name ‘Abaddon’
tattooed in red letters across his stomach, and (3) photographs of multiple
swastika tattoos on Dawson’s back and a picture of a swastika he had painted
on the wall of his prison cell.
Id.
321. See id. at 162 (quoting the stipulation agreement: “The Aryan Brotherhood
refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960’s in California in response
to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan
Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware.”).
322. Only Justice Blackmun provided a concurring opinion. See Dawson, 503 U.S.
at 169 (including only one dissenting opinion, that of Justice Thomas).
323. Id. at 165.
324. See id. at 166 (noting that the murder victim was white, as is Dawson). Justice
Rehnquist also noted that, at best, the evidence of Dawson’s gang membership

SHORTNACYPP

2001]

1/24/02 6:00 PM

GUILTY AND GAY

359

Rehnquist ultimately concluded that the State of Delaware was
prevented “from employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs
at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the
issue being tried”—whether a sentence of life imprisonment or a
325
sentence of death should be imposed.
Dawson is particularly instructive because like Dawson’s status as a
gang member, the homosexual status of the defendants in Lingar,
Neill, Allen, and Burdine, was neither an element of the crime, nor a
326
motive.
In fact, at least one state court has already applied the
holding of Dawson to exclude evidence of a defendant’s homosexual
327
The prosecutor argued that evidence of the defendant’s
status.
homosexual relationships while avoiding capture was necessary to
328
help explain how the defendant obtained money to remain at large.
Although the court found the latter probative, it cited Dawson in
refusing to allow evidence of the defendant’s sexual orientation
because the evidence might inappropriately prejudice the defendant
329
as the jury may view such conduct as morally reprehensible.
330
Therefore, the Court’s holding in Dawson, while not a perfect fit,
arguably precludes the state from similarly introducing highly
“proved nothing more than Dawson’s abstract beliefs,” and therefore violated his
First Amendment rights. See id. at 167 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) that “the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
325. See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168 (noting that the conclusion that the evidence of
gang membership was irrelevant and was therefore constitutional error, the Court
vacated the death sentence and remanded the case to the Delaware Supreme Court).
326. But see supra notes 149-50, 155 and accompanying text (revealing that in
Lingar, the prosecutor’s outward justification for introducing testimony about
Lingar’s sexual orientation was that it showed a motive in the killing of Scott Allen,
that Lingar wanted to keep his homosexuality a secret; and concluding that the
prosecutor’s reasoning was a pretext for raising prejudicial and inflammatory
testimony because the prosecutor never sought to establish that Lingar’s sexual
orientation was in fact a secret).
327. See State v. Cohen, 634 A.2d 380, 392 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1992) (granting the
defendant’s motion to bar evidence of his homosexual encounters in the sentencing
hearing of his capital trial because the court found no relevance in such an
evidentiary finding).
328. See id. at 392.
329. See id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) for the
proposition that “[e]ven within the broad range of evidence admissible in a penalty
hearing, undue prejudice to the defendant must be avoided”).
330. A person’s sexual orientation is by no means akin to an “abstract belief.” See
Kurt D. Hermansen, Note, Analyzing the Military’s Justifications for Its Exclusionary Policy:
Fifty Years Without a Rational Basis, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 174 (1992) (describing a
person’s sexual orientation as a “central, defining trait of personhood, which one
may alter only at the expense of significant damage to one’s identity.”); see also
Denise Dunnigan, Note, Constitutional Law: A New Suspect Class: A Final Reprieve for
Homosexuals in the Military?, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 284 (1989) (analogizing sexual
orientation to race and national origin, in that sexual orientation plays a key role in a
person’s self-perception, group affiliation and identification by others).
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prejudicial and irrelevant evidence about a defendant’s sexual
orientation in the sentencing phase of capital trials.
B. A Prosecutor’s Prejudicial and Inflammatory Statements About a
Criminal Defendant’s Homosexual Status in the Sentencing Phase of a
Capital Trial Should Constitute Reversible Error
Prosecutorial misconduct in sentencing hearings where
prosecutors exhibit positive bias (i.e., the discriminatory
mischaracterization and stereotyping of defendants based on their
331
sexual orientation) and in cases where the prosecutors make
disrespectful references (i.e., homophobic and inflammatory
332
should
comments about a defendant’s sexual orientation)
333
constitute reversible error. Various federal circuit courts have held
that biased comments, and/or the introduction of previously
334
335
ethnicity,
undisclosed evidence about the defendant’s race,
336
337
religion, and even sexual orientation by the prosecutor constitute
331. See supra Part II.B (discussing the prosecutor’s positive bias in the case of
Allen).
332. See supra Part II.C (discussing the prosecutor’s use of disrespectful references,
including prejudicial and inflammatory statements about the defendant’s
homosexuality in Burdine).
333. See supra notes 314, 318 and accompanying text (observing that reversible
error found in the sentencing phase ordinarily results in a remand and a new
sentencing hearing; and that a new sentencing hearing would be effective in
remedying and deterring the prosecutorial misconduct).
334. See United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing a
conviction upon concluding that “the prosecutor’s discourse on the activities of
Jamaican drug dealers and the accompanying tie-in with appellants were legally
improper.”); United States v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1973)
(concluding that a state prosecutor’s use of racially prejudicial remarks during
closing arguments violated defendant’s rights to a fair trial and was therefore
impermissible).
335. See United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1211-13 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that admission of testimony tying members of a particular ethnicity and from a
particular geographic region with a specific type of drug trade violated the criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights).
336. See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a prosecutor
violated criminal defendant’s constitutional rights by appealing to jury to rely on
racial, ethnic, and religious stereotypes).
337. See Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “a
state may not use the death penalty as a mechanism for enforcing societal norms
regarding sexual activity[,]” and that “no additional blame attaches to a capital
defendant who has previously been the victim of incest, engaged in homosexuality,
or had ‘abnormal’ relations with women of ages different than himself.”); United
States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 478 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that “it was error to
admit evidence from which the jury could infer [that the defendant was involved in]
a homosexual relationship.”); Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that the introduction of evidence of homosexuality creates a “clear
potential that the jury may have been unfairly influenced by whatever biases and
stereotypes they might hold with regard to homosexuals”); United States v. Birrell,
421 F.2d 665, 666 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (reversing a defendant’s conviction
for theft because the prosecutor’s comments “invited conviction irrespective of
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reversible error. The federal courts of appeal should uniformly
hold that the prosecutor’s prejudicial use of evidence about the
defendant’s homosexual status in the sentencing phase of capital
trials constitutes reversible error and, therefore, should grant
339
defendants new sentencing hearings.
340
The leading case, Bains v. Cambra,
involving prosecutorial
comments about a defendant who was a member of the Sikh religion,
341
is analogous to prosecutorial comments about sexual orientation.
Like a defendant’s religion, the homosexual status of a defendant
342
Indeed, when the
may not be readily apparent to others.
defendant’s homosexuality was not in evidence at trial, as was the case
343
in Lingar, the prosecutor’s biased motivations for introducing it in
the sentencing phase should be even more apparent to reviewing
344
courts.
The Bains court found that the prosecutor’s closing arguments
highlighted testimony that went “beyond merely providing evidence
345
In commenting on that evidence, the
of motive and intent.”
prosecutor stated, “[i]f you do certain conduct with respect to a Sikh
person’s female family member, look out.
You can expect
violence . . . . What you don’t understand . . . was the laws in the
United States is [sic] not what we’re talking about. We’re playing this
innocence of the crime charged, upon the ground that appellant was a
homosexual.”).
338. See Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *18 (10th Cir. Dec. 7,
2001) (Lucero, J., dissenting) (citing cases from other circuits where the courts have
“overturned convictions when prosecutors have made statements highlighting sexual
orientation or race in clear attempts to manipulate the prejudices of the jury” and
concluding that “[o]ur decision today thus creates a circuit split.”).
339. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
340. 204 F.3d 964.
341. The true analogy to Bains is in the court’s rejection of the prosecutor’s
prejudicial remarks about the defendant’s religious beliefs in the closing arguments.
In Bains, however, the defendant’s religion and its customs and traditions were very
much a part of the trial. See id. at 970 (recounting testimony of an officer of the
Sutter County Sheriff’s Department who was qualified and accepted by the trial court
as an expert witness in the Sikh religion).
342. See Brower, supra note 4 (discussing sexual identity and its disclosure and
concealment in the courtroom).
343. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecutor’s
outward justification for the prejudicial remarks, and concluding that it was pretext);
see also Paul J. Speigelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of
Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 140-69 (1999) (reviewing
forty-five cases since 1990 where federal courts have reversed convictions on the basis
of prosecutorial misconduct, and discussing the role of the prosecutors’ intent in
influencing the decisions of the reviewing courts).
344. See id. at 140-41 (finding in twenty eight of the forty-five reversed cases, the
reviewing courts “used language suggesting that the prosecutor made arguments he
or she knew or should have known were improper”).
345. See Bains, 204 F.3d at 974.
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346

game by Sikh rules.”
The court held that the prosecutor’s
comments invited the jury to “give in to their prejudices and to buy
347
into the various stereotypes that the prosecutor was promoting.”
Bains stands strongly for the principle that prosecutors can and
often do cross the line between legally appropriate commenting on
348
the evidence, and attempting to exploit the potential prejudices of
349
the jury. Indeed, the reasoning of the Bains court emphasizes the
point that prosecutors should not be allowed to furtively couch their
350
prejudicial comments in ostensibly legally appropriate arguments.
C. A Glimmer of Hope: Judge Carlos Lucero’s dissent in Neill
Judge Carlos Lucero’s scathing dissents in both of Neill’s hearings
before the Tenth Circuit panel provide a glimmer of hope to
homosexual people still on death row that their claims of sexual
orientation discrimination may no longer fall on deaf ears at the
351
352
federal appellate court level.
In contrast to the majority, which
initially dismissed Neill’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct in one
353
short paragraph, Lucero dedicated almost all of his seven-page
354
dissent to the issue of sexual orientation bias.
In his initial dissent, Lucero reasoned that the prosecutor’s
355
comments were “[a]t their core . . . tantamount to urging the jury
346. Id. at 970.
347. Id. at 974. See also Rovella, supra note 21, at A25 (reporting the findings of a
national survey of potential jurors which found that seventeen percent of the
respondents admitted that they could not be fair to homosexual litigants); Burdine,
Petition for Habeas Corpus supra note 269 (revealing that several jurors in Burdine
were empanelled without objection even after they admitted open hostility towards
homosexuals in voir dire).
348. See generally 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 572 (1991) (discussing boundaries of
appropriate comments by the prosecutor in sentencing phases of capital trials; and
collecting cases).
349. See Rovella, supra note 21, at A25 (polling potential jurors as to their biases).
350. See supra Part II (discussing the prosecutor’s biased motives in Neill, Lingar,
and Allen; and providing the benign justification that each prosecutor presented to
the reviewing court for their biased comments, ranging from providing evidence that
goes to the character of the defendant to responding to a mitigating circumstance
offered by the defendant).
351. See Neill, 263 F.3d at 1199 (Lucero, J., dissenting); Neill v. Gibson, No. 006024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *15 (10th Cir. Dec. 7, 2001) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
352. Part II.A.2 of this Comment discusses the majority’s opinions in both
hearings at length.
353. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s decision
in the first hearing not to evaluate Neill’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct on the
merits).
354. See Neill, 263 F.3d at 1199-1205 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (focusing his entire
analysis on Neill’s claim that his sexual orientation was used against him in the
sentencing hearing).
355. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (quoting the prosecutor’s
comments).
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to return the death sentence because a defendant fits within any
other group that has been the target of prejudice and
356
discrimination.” Lucero found that the prosecutor’s explicit appeal
to the jurors to focus on Neill’s homosexual status when deciding his
357
punishment was an obviously improper appeal to their prejudices.
Analogizing the prejudicial impact of homophobic remarks to that of
358
racist ones, Lucero concludes that remarks about sexual orientation
359
in death penalty cases may also require reversal. Ultimately, Lucero
stated: “I cannot sanction—because I have no confidence in—a
sentencing proceeding tainted by a prosecutor’s request that jurors
impose a death sentence based, even in part, on who the defendant is
360
rather than what he has done.”
361
Upon the rehearing before the panel, Lucero again dissented
and again devoted most of his dissent to addressing Neill’s claims of
362
sexual orientation bias. After criticizing the majority for application
363
of the Donnelly/Darden standard, Lucero concluded that the court
should have granted habeas relief and should have remanded the
364
case for re-sentencing.
His powerful conclusion is worthy of
restatement:
The message of this case will then be unavoidable. Bottom line:
The prosecutor got away with conduct that the majority labels
“improper” and that I consider outrageous and overwhelmingly
prejudicial. I consider the error before us to be of a magnitude
that ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness. Integrity, [and] public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’ The precedent for future cases
365
is disturbing.

Unfortunately, Judge Lucero stands alone in the near legion of
federal appellate judges who refuse to find that the egregious nature
of the prosecutor’s comments regarding homosexual people deprive
356. Neill, 263 F.3d at 1202.
357. See id. (regarding prosecutorial appeals to prejudice and citing to American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c) (3d ed. 1993)).
358. This is an important analogy because unlike the race of the defendant, which
is always apparent to jurors, the defendant’s sexual orientation may in fact never
have been known—before being surreptitiously introduced by prosecutors.
359. See Neill, 263 F.3d at 1203 (citing and quoting Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d 221,
223 (1987) that “in a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is called
upon to make a ‘highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the
punishment that a particular person deserves’.”).
360. Id.
361. Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *13-*25 (10th Cir. Dec. 7.
2001) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
362. See id. at *13-23 (discussing Neill’s claims of sexual orientation bias).
363. Part III of this Comment discusses the Donnelly/Darden standard as it was
applied by the Tenth Circuit in Neill.
364. See Neill v. Gibson, No. 00-6024, 2001 WL 1584819, at *25 (stating same).
365. See id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
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defendants (such as Lingar, Neill, Allen, and Burdine) of fair
sentencing hearings. Lucero’s dissent is an important first step in
calling the attention of the judiciary and the legal community to this
kind of prosecutorial misconduct. Opinions like Lucero’s, which are
highly critical of the prosecutor’s actions and the biased intentions
that motivated them, play a critical role in deterring similar conduct
366
by prosecutors in the future. Although reviewing judges should do
more in these cases to deter future conduct, including referring the
367
prosecutors for discipline by the bar, Lucero’s dissent begins to
send the message to prosecutors that this conduct is unacceptable
368
369
both ethically and professionally.
CONCLUSION
It seems that Justice Lewis Powell’s concern in his concurring
370
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,
that punishment based on a
defendant’s homosexual status raises serious Eighth Amendment
371
questions, has come to fruition. With laws prohibiting the marriage
of persons of the same gender, and punishing consensual sex
between adults of the same gender, and with sexual orientation being
stripped from state and local anti-discrimination statutes across the
country, our system of laws is increasingly becoming more hostile
toward homosexual people. Furthermore, as several studies reveal,
the legal community itself, as an institution, as a workplace, and as a
training ground for future lawyers, makes the courtroom an
incredibly hostile environment for homosexual people. Magnifying
this already hostile system of laws, prosecuting attorneys as advocates
and agents of the state, are actually administering the law in
366. See Speigelman, supra note 343, at 169 (discussing the role of reviewing courts
in deterring future misconduct by prosecutors).
367. See id. (arguing that in order to prevent “recidivist” prosecutors from
continuing their misconduct, reviewing courts should do more than just censure by
reversal, rather they should reprimand them by name in published decisions and
refer them to local bars by name).
368. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the various federal,
state, and local court rules which prohibit biased conduct on the basis of sexual
orientation).
369. See American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.8(c) & (d)
(3d ed. 1993) (providing that “[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments
calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury”; and that “[t]he prosecutor should
refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case
on the evidence.”).
370. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that a Georgia anti-sodomy statute did not
violated constitutional rights).
371. See id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that while there is no
substantive due process right to engage in homosexual sodomy, “[t]his is not to
suggest, however, that [Bowers] may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution.”).
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discriminatory ways against homosexual defendants. They are
regularly making calculated decisions about when and how to
introduce evidence of defendants’ sexual orientation in order to
appeal to the jury’s passions and prejudices. The horrifying result is
that the state may be imposing its ultimate form of punishment on
homosexual defendants at least in part because of their sexual
orientation.
This Comment has argued that these homosexual defendants are
also left with no real post-conviction remedies.
Because the
prejudicial remarks by prosecutors are generally both calculated and
isolated, the standard of review, which requires appellate courts to
look at the comments in the context of the entire trial, and to
evaluate the comments in light of the evidence of guilt, leaves little
hope for these homosexual people who are awaiting their executions
on death row.
As some Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, and indeed a majority
of the public, seem poised to reconsider the application of the death
penalty in America, sexual orientation bias must be included in that
debate. In order to correct and to deter the biased behavior of
prosecutors, this Comment offers two specific recommendations:
(1) that the prosecutor’s introduction of unrelated evidence of a
criminal defendant’s homosexual status in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial should constitute reversible error; and (2) that a
prosecutor’s prejudicial and inflammatory statements about a
criminal defendant’s homosexual status in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial should constitute reversible error. In both situations,
reviewing courts should vacate the defendant’s death sentence and
remand the case for a new sentencing determination.
Furthermore, a systematic study is needed to more fully determine
and quantify the extent and prevalence of sexual orientation bias
within the entire legal community. Finally, compliance with already
existing professional canons prohibiting biased conduct on the basis
of sexual orientation must be enforced. Judge Lucero’s dissent in
Neill may well represent a turning point in the federal judiciary in
reviewing these claims of biased prosecutorial conduct. Significant
steps, however, must still be taken to ensure that the death penalty in
America is not imposed on homosexual people even in part because of
who they are, rather than for what they have done.

